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Delegation of the European Commission based in Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BH) granted the consortium represented by ECORYS a contract for EU
support to the Economic Policy Research Unit, a subdivision of the Economic Policy
Planning Unit of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As part of this
project activities a subproject was designed trying to assess the position of BH against
the benchmarks of the Copenhagen economic criteria and to identify policy measures
for meeting the criteria. The issues of particular relevance to the project included:
presentation of the Copenhagen economic criteria, analysis of the existing situation in
the country, strategic and policy documents addressing the subject, identification of
gaps to be filled in order to achieve the benchmark, and policy recommendations. In
July, 2006 ECORYS appointed the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE),
an international, non-profit research and advisory institution, to research on the
subject. The research project team comprised experts: Messrs. Rafał Antczak (team
leader), Wojciech Paczyński, and Ranko Markuš, Mmes. Małgorzata Antczak and
Karina Kostrzewa, assisted by Mr. Erol Mujanovic.
The report was based on available national account and microeconomic data,
strategic and policy documents of the BH governmental bodies, relevant reports by
international organisations, EU institutions, academic and research centres and
opinions of key stakeholders. The analytical research on the economic developments
in BH by international financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank, as
well as domestic bodies, especially the Economic Policy Research Unit, was
extensively exploited in the research. However, the primary focus of the research was
on structural and institutional aspects facilitating or impeding functioning of a market
economy in the BH and country's capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the EU. Therefore, the report focuses on background analysis of
economic factors influencing the functioning of market economy and the capacity to
withstand the competition in the EU market.
The research consists of four main parts. In Part 1, the Copenhagen economic
criteria are presented in a comparative perspective of the recent experiences of the new
11
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Introduction
member states and acceding countries to allow diagnosing of the most important gaps
to be filled by BH. Part 2 analyses macroeconomic developments in BH, presenting
them in a comparative perspective relative to EU candidate countries. The special
focus is on two fields where BH faces particularly difficult challenges: labour market
and foreign trade. Also, the three scenarios of BH catching-up with the EU are
presented. Privatisation process which is one of the most important institutional and
structural features of every transition economy and especially relevant from the
perspective of meeting the Copenhagen criteria is analysed in Part 3. Part 4 comprises
analysis of microeconomic developments in BH with the elements of the financial
analysis of enterprises, both state and private. The financial analysis of enterprises
concentrates on current situation and identification of trends in microeconomic
developments to identify comparative advantages, assess productivity, and to position
the BH enterprise sector towards the potential competition on the EU markets. Finally,
Part 5 includes policy recommendations for decision makers both from the BH
government and the EC. The research is supplemented by the Annexes providing
background pieces of information on the analysed topics. 
The project team established contacts with representatives of international
organizations, the BH governmental bodies, and research community in BH to collect
pieces of information and consult on research topics. However, the authors of the
researchers bear the sole responsibility for the pieces of information and opinions
presented in the report.
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The basic conditions for enlargement of the European Union are laid out in article
49 of the EC Treaty, which stipulates that “any European state may apply to become a
member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the
European Parliament (…)”. In principle, the only material condition relating to the
accession of a new state to the European Union is that the applicant is a “European
state”. The term “European” has not been officially defined. It is therefore interpreted in
terms of geography, culture and history. These are the factors that are believed to
contribute to the forging of a European identity which formed the basis for the past waves
of EU enlargements. However, once the former communist countries from Central and
Eastern Europe expressed their intentions to become member states, the EU had to
identify the political and economic values common to all “European countries”.
The conditions that pre-accession candidates have to fulfil are specified in the
European Commission report from 1993 entitled “Europe and the challenge of
enlargement”. They were made formal by the member states at the Copenhagen
European Council1 in June 1993. The Council concluded that “the associated countries
in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Union”.
Accession could take place as soon as an applicant was able to “assume the obligations
of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions”. Member states also
set out the qualifying criteria for EU membership, the so-called Copenhagen criteria.
According to the conclusions of the Copenhagen summit, the EU membership requires:
1. The achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criterion);
2. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (economic criterion);
3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, that is to adopt the
common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law,
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union
(acquis criterion).
13
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1. The Economic Copenhagen Criteria
1 Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22 June, 1993, SN 180/93.
Even with the briefest of analyses it is noticeable that the Copenhagen criteria are
formulated in a very general way. This may suggest that it will be easier to fulfil them,
as compared to the Maastricht criteria that are defined in terms of strict economic
indices. On the other hand, the way the Copenhagen criteria allow various
interpretations and might be employed to postpone any particular EU enlargement
even if reforms are advanced and the requirements have been fulfilled by the applicant
countries. It is worth remembering that the EU has the right to revise and change
accession conditions. Although there is a single common aim of enlargement for both
applicant and member states, there is no doubt that members of the EU have the final
word on any particular enlargement process. 
There are a number of interpretation problems2 with the Copenhagen criteria.
First of all, the criteria are formulated in such a way that they are considered to be a
“moving target problem”, i.e. meeting the accession conditions is made more difficult
because their specific content keeps changing. This perception tends to generate
frustration in the candidate states and further suspicions about the EU’s commitment
to enlargement in general and a transparent criteria-based approach in particular.
Partly, this problem arises from the development of and amendments to the acquis
itself. However, the large scope of the accession conditions has also allowed the EU
to stress different issues at different times for the candidates. Particularly, over a long
accession process amid rapidly changing conditions – and when the EU is engaged in
a steep learning process related to its future members – flexibility has considerable
advantages. There may be a political rationale for focusing on key demands early in
the process so as not to discourage candidates before moving on to more challenging
requirements for more advanced applicants. 
Furthermore, a measurement problem arises. Many of the requirements falling
both under political and economic criteria are difficult to measure in any objective
sense. Where quantitative measures may be available for assessment under the
political criterion, the EU has chosen not to develop or use them. No strict
quantitative minimum is also established for economic criteria to enter the EU. The
application of conditionality is not transparent and consistent. 
Another issue is the consistency problem. This applies to the way in which the EU
has linked membership conditions to progress in accession, between both
enlargement “waves” – the southern enlargement of the 1980s and the 2004
enlargement. In particular, whereas the EU has made the minority rights issue a key
reason not to open accession negotiations with Turkey for a long time, some have
contended that the minority rights question is far from being resolved in Estonia or
Latvia. Apart from the possibility that inconsistency could undermine the system of
14
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2 “Assessing the Accession Criteria”, report from workshop: Political Dimensions of the Accession Criteria,
European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 30 November 2002.
conditionality in general, there is a risk of uneven use of conditionality in the case of
the Balkan states. 
The sufficiency problem is also specific to the Copenhagen criteria. A particular
aspect of the consistency issue is the question of the minimum degree of fulfilment of the
criteria necessary and sufficient for the attainment of each stage in the accession process,
especially accession itself. There is no need to mention that the scale of the requirements
is changing, i.e. there was a general agreement that the Helsinki 1999 summit decision
represented the key shift away from the previous practice that the political criterion had
to be fully satisfied before accession negotiations could begin, as demonstrated in the
1997 Luxembourg Council’s decision to exclude Slovakia from initial accession talks.
This is a problem of establishing minimum sufficient entry conditions.
These issues all relate to the three criteria set for candidate countries. However,
apart from the fulfilment of accession conditions, other sets of considerations might
be well regarded as legitimate factors in enlargement decisions, such as WTO, Council
of Europe or OSCE membership. 
It is worth mentioning that from the EU side, the Copenhagen criteria are
considered an instrument encouraging further transformation and democratisation
processes. Through the progressive development and deployment of accession
conditionality, the EU is effectively using the prospect of membership as its main foreign
policy instrument in its immediate backyard. However, where the reforms in aspirant
states face difficulties, it can be argued that an early “reward”, such as progress through
the accession process even where conditions have not been satisfactorily fulfilled, can
benefit reformers. Although there is the counter-argument that an even more rigid
adherence to conditionality will in fact yield greater reform results. Either way,
enlargement decisions can become prospective tools for influencing the domestic
balance of forces, rather than retrospective reflections on fulfilment of conditionality.
1.1. Benchmark Selection for Bosnia and Herzegovina
To set the stage for further discussion it seems necessary to compare past and
present economic indicators of BH with NMS8 of the EU that joined in 2004 (Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia) and with the
group of countries with formal candidate status in 2006 (Turkey, Croatia, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the two acceding countries Bulgaria and
Romania), as well as other economies in the South Eastern Europe (SEE) region.
15
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However, before proceeding with analysis on recent developments and discussion
on the medium-term prospects it may be useful to take a historical perspective and
check how BH compared to other European countries at the beginning of 20th
century (Table 1). This confirms that a century ago BH was at the similar development
level as Italy, and ahead of Greece for example. It lagged somewhat behind Central
European countries, such as Austria and Hungary, but the gap was not dramatic. This
could be viewed as an indication that divergence and convergence in levels of
economic developments may take place in relatively short periods; a few decades can
make a major difference.
Judging by current GDP per capita levels and changes in these levels over the past
decade, BH today is at a stage comparable to those of the five current candidate and
accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Turkey – BRCMT) roughly a decade ago (Figure 1). On the other hand,
NMS8 had a visibly higher average GDP per capita back in 1996 (in fact, even in
1993) than BH in 2005-2006. Among this group of countries only 1997-1998 Latvian
GDP per capita was comparable to the 2005-2006 BH level. However, the gap to
Bulgaria and Romania (joining the EU in January 2007) is visibly smaller – BH’s
2005-2006 GDP per capita level is comparable to Bulgaria and Romania in 2000-2001
(i.e. 5-6 years before accession). BH’s development level (as proxied by GDP per
capita) is comparable to other Balkan countries that have not yet started negotiations
on EU accession (Albania and Serbia3).
In terms of speed of convergence, BH recorded very high growth rates just after
the war, although these can be attributed to post-conflict reconstruction activities.
Growth rates after 2000 appear to be more in line with BH’s current growth potential.
Here, one can observe that BH has experienced similar GDP per capita growth rates
as is also the case for the NMS8 or BRCMT and A&S groups. Over the period 2000-
2006 BH recorded average annual growth rates of around 6.6% per annum, while for
the three comparative groups this oscillated between 6.2% and 7.3%4. This indicates
16
Rafał Antczak, Małgorzata Antczak, Karina Kostrzewa, Ranko Markuš, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 72/2007
3 Historical data for Montenegro are not available from the IMF. The de facto economic partition of Serbia an
Montenegro has had a negative impact on the quality of economic data for the country. The development level o
Source: Palairet (1997), cited in Gligorov (2002).
Table 1: National product per capita in selected European countries in 1910 (1970 US$)
Germany 958 Bosnia 546
Austria 810 Croatia 542
Czech lands 819 Serbia 462
Hungary 616 Greece 455
Italy 546 Russia 398
that while BH has been recently catching up with the more developed EU countries
(for example the EU15 group), there was hardly any convergence, even a divergence,
with other European economies – NMS8 and the Balkan accession and candidate
countries. Given its very low development level, its human capital and other
characteristics and the experience of other transition economies it would appear that
BH might be able to boost its potential economic growth to higher levels. The key to
improving development potential lies in domestic reforms.
1.1.1. The Issues of Measurement
The Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) implicitly gave responsibility for statistical
functions to both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska
and in August 1998 the state created its own statistical institute, the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Agency for Statistics (BHAS), with a view to compiling country-wide
statistics in accordance with internationally accepted methodologies and acting as the
primary coordinating agency for contacts with international agencies. Significant
technical assistance has been provided in recent years, mainly by the European Union
and the IMF, in the development of all areas of macroeconomic statistics. However,
the results of compilation of FBH and RS statistics and the technical assistance have
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4 Other measures of GDP per capita could produce slightly different results but are unlikely to change the
qualitative assessment presented in this and previous paragraphs. Eurostat does not currently publish GDP
per capita expressed in PPS for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Note: Simple averages are presented for all country groupings: NMS8 – the eight countries that joined the
EU in 2004; BRCMT - Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey; A&S – Albania and Serbia.
2006 values are the IMF forecasts.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, September 2006.
Figure 1: GDP per capita: Bosnia and Herzegovina compared with other groups of countries
(in US$ thousands at PPP exchange rates)
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been mixed. Both have published nominal GDP estimates using the production
approach based on international standards, since 1998 and 1999, respectively.
However, in both cases, production estimates at constant prices and GDP by
expenditure are still unavailable and informal sector activities are under-recorded
(see below). A household budget survey (serving as the basis for revising price indices
and facilitating the compilation of GDP by the expenditure approach) has been
completed. However, there are still no meaningful short-term business and consumer
surveys. Both statistical offices compile price indices using outdated methodologies
and consistent time series are not available. Industrial production indices are
prepared in both FBH and RS but there is no index at the country level and consistent
time series are not available. Labour statistics are the weakest area and data on
employment, unemployment and wage rates are based on deficient methodologies.
The quality of trade and the balance of payments data published by the BHAS and
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH) is generally poor, in particular with
regard to coverage both of current and capital account positions, especially foreign
grants, employees’ remittances, income residents receive from working for
international organisations in BH and spending by their non-resident staff, as well as
trade credit by suppliers. 
The CBBH, in accord with both finance ministers and governments, has been
working on compiling Government Finance Statistics (GFS) on a countrywide basis. In
2005, Bosnia reported GFS for the first time for publication in the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook covering central government operations for 2003 and 2004. 
Probably the most reliable statistics at the national level are the monetary accounts
by the CBBH reported on both a countrywide and individual territorial unit basis.
Weighted average interest rate data for bank deposits and loans are available from
January 2002 onward for publication in the International Financial Statistics (IFS)5. 
National accounts data for BH are not adjusted for the non-observed economy
(NOE)6 in contrast to EU countries, including NMS8 and countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The adjustments for the NOE are
significant and range from 12% of the observed economy for the NMS8 to over 30%
for the CIS. A number of studies have estimated the NOE for BH: an OECD report
estimated it from 57.7% to 52.6% of officially estimated GDP during 2001-20037,
while an IMF report based on regression analysis estimated it at 30% of official GDP8.
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6 The NOE comprises underground, informal and illegal production according to OECD methodology – see,
Handbook for Measurement of the Non-Observed Economy, 2004.
7 Dell’Anno, Roberto and Marje Piirisild, 2004, Estimates of the Non-Observed Economy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, OECD.
8 IMF, 2005, Selected Issues, Report 05/158.
Therefore, ratios to GDP – important comparative and informative indicators for any
economy, may appear less accurate for BH than for any other EU country9. 
In 2005-2006, BH presented a similar level of GDP per capita PPP as Lithuania
and Latvia in 1996-1997 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2000-2001, which in both
cases was 7 years before accession to the EU, respectively in 2004 and in 2007
(compare the shaded cells in ). A “conservative” 30% adjustment for the NOE would
obviously improve the benchmark level for BH and situate the country at the level of
NMS 2-3 years before EU accession. 
Lithuania and Latvia may set the proper benchmark for BH across several other
economic and political aspects. Both Lithuania and Latvia and BH faced a difficult
external situation at the beginning of their transitions, including the collapse of the
political system, trade flows, and complicated relations with their neighbours – Russia
and Serbia, respectively. On the other hand, the economies of Lithuania and Latvia and
BH were gravitating economically and politically towards the prosperous EU, which
became a neighbour. The similar exchange rate regimes (currency board arrangements)
of Lithuania and Latvia and BH make possible comparison of the conditions for
economic policy, including monetary policy, fiscal policy and foreign trade. There are
also other similarities between Lithuania and Latvia and BH, including population size,
level of social security contributions (35% of the gross wage), and the significant size of
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9 World Bank, 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Addressing Fiscal Challenges and Enhancing Growth Prospects. A
Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Report No. 36156-BiH.
Note: 2006 values are the IMF forecasts.
Source: IMF WEO database, September 2006.
Table 2: GDP per capita PPP in accession countries, 1995-2006 (US$)
1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BH  n/a 3 149 4 137 4 394 4 673 4 969 5 232 5 631 6 035 6 456
Slovenia 12 391 13 973 15 658 16 604 17 423 18 307 19 137 20 537 21 808 23 159
Malta 13 263 14 761 16 136 18 017 18 253 18 667 18 555 19 100 19 739 20 365
Czech 12 041 12 943 13 226 13 968 14 750 15 266 16 074 17 220 18 341 19 428
Hungary 9 322 10 267 11 555 12 460 13 277 14 016 14 769 15 838 16 823 17 821
Estonia 6 831 8 453 9 260 10 258 11 225 12 300 13 440 14 926 16 414 17 802
Lithuania 6 172 7 440 8 164 8 699 9 544 10 401 11 685 12 856 14 158 15 443
Latvia 5 121 6 098 6 895 7 600 8 452 9 226 10 177 11 396 12 666 13 875
Poland 7 128 8 346 9 340 9 914 10 384 10 719 11 359 12 293 12 994 13 797
Slovakia 8 870 10 165 10 985 11 453 12 161 12 934 13 775 14 904 16 041 17 239
Croatia 6 957 7 940 8 310 9 079 9 587 10 249 10 907 11 626 12 325 13 062
Bulgaria 5 724 5 234 5 791 6 278 6 736 7 238 7 756 8 464 9 223 10 003
Romania 5 550 5 676 5 531 5 799 6 306 6 769 7 291 8 132 8 785 9 446
Macedonia 5 394 5 677 6 225 6 623 6 454 6 608 6 962 7 302 7 748 8 175
Turkey 5 281 6 145 6 074 6 364 5 928 6 407 6 807 7 494 7 950 8 385
Albania 2 670 2 665 3 435 3 754 4 115 4 300 4 622 4 997 5 405 5 818
Serbia n/a n/a n/a 3 795 4 105 4 341 4 543 4 992 5 348 5 713
NOE. Similarly to NMS8 (notably Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Poland) at the
beginning of the transition, the structure of the industrial sector in BH was dominated
by a small number of large companies and a weak SME sector. The level of economic
freedom in Lithuania and Latvia (as well as in Poland and Slovakia) in 1999 and BH –
now – also seems comparable. Finally, bearing in mind the conflicts in BH, which
devastated economic activity (especially production of higher value added goods and
services) BH’s structure of output in 2005 is similar to the majority of NMS8 in 2000. 
The GDP per capita is not the only comparative and informative indicator for an
economy. The human development index published in the Human Development
Report looks beyond GDP to a broader definition of well-being. The HDI provides a
composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and
healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy
and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent
standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity income). However, the index
is not in any sense a comprehensive measure of human development and it does not,
for example, include important indicators such as inequality, respect for human rights
or political freedoms. What it does provide is a broadened prism for viewing human
progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being. 
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Source: IMF WEO database, September 2006.
Figure 2: Value added by sector (as a percentage of GDP)
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In 2004, BH presented a similar level of human development as Lithuania and
Latvia in 1999, which was 5 years before these two countries joined the EU (see Table
3 and Figure 3). The progress in human development in BH was noticeable
comparing HDI in 2001 and 2004. However, during 1999-2004, just before the EU
accession Lithuania and Latvia (together with Estonia) achieved a very substantial
progress in development that resulted from a broadening and deepening of economic
reforms. The Baltic countries were the first countries from NMS8 that finalised
accession negotiations with the EU. Following the case of the Baltic countries by BH
would require not only designing of broad scale economic and political reform
agenda, but most of all fast and comprehensive implementation of these reforms.
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Source: Human Development Report, 2006.
Table 3: Human development index 2004
HDI
Life
expectancy
at birth
Adult literacy
Combined primary
secondary and tertiary
gross enrolment ratio
GDP
per capita
rank value rank years rank
(% ages 15
and older) rank % rank
PPP
USD
Poland 37 0.862 45 74.6 . . 38 86.0 48 12974
Lithuania 41 0.857 66 72.5 6 99.6 20 91.8 47 13107
Estonia 40 0.858 75 71.6 4 99.8 21 91.6 44 14555.0
Slovakia 42 0.856 50 74.3 2 100.0 64 76.7 43 14623
Croatia 44 0.846 42 75.2 21 98.1 84 73.5 51 12191
Latvia 45 0.845 73 71.8 5 92.6 24 90.1 54 11653
Bulgaria 54 0.816 67 72.4 20 98.2 52 80.9 66 8078
Romania 60 0.805 78 71.5 26 97.3 74 75.3 63 8480
BH 62 0.800 49 74.3 31 96.7 111 67.3 78 7032
Albania 73 0.784 53 73.9 16 98.7 109 68.0 97 4978
Source: Human Development Reports 2001-2006, UNDP
Figure 3: HDI and GDP per capita in selected countries in 1999-2004
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1.2. Interpretation of the Economic Copenhagen Criteria
The EU established a twofold set of economic criteria to examine the economic
readiness for membership of an applicant country. It requires the candidate to have:
• a functioning market economy;
• the capacity to be competitive on the EU market.
The former requires the functioning of a viable market economy, with free and
open competition, price and trade liberalisation and a developed financial services
sector. The latter consists of two dimensions of the environment of competitiveness
according to the definition recognised by the European Commission, namely that
enterprises are obliged to develop their ability to cope with competitive pressures and
forces in the European Union’s internal market, as well as the whole economy of the
applicant country compared to the economies of EU members. 
These sub-criteria are linked. Firstly, only a functioning market economy will be better
able to cope with competitive pressure. Secondly, in the EU, the functioning market is the
internal market. Without integration with the internal market, EU membership would lose
its economic significance, both for the applicant country and for its partners. The adoption
of the acquis communautaire, which is the third Copenhagen criterion, and in particular
the internal market acquis, is therefore essential for a candidate country, which must
commit itself permanently to the economic obligations of membership. This commitment
is needed to provide the certainty that every part of the enlarged EU market will continue
to operate by common rules. At the level of the public authorities, membership of the EU
requires the administrative and legal capacity to transpose and implement the wide range
of technical legislation needed to remove obstacles to freedom of movement within the
Union and so ensure the working of the single market. At the level of individual firms, the
impact on their competitiveness of adopting the acquis depends on their capacity to adapt
to the new economic environment.
Despite the exclusive right of the EU member states to a free interpretation of the
criteria, the definition of a free market economy is essentially based on concrete
indicators taken into account by the European Commission10 such as:
• overall assessment of the transformation process, including privatisation
progress, the role of the state in the economy and economic structure;
• liberalisation of prices and external liberalisation (elimination of all trade
barriers; complete convertibility of the national currency);
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10 “Agenda 2000 communication, volume I: for wider and stronger Union”, European Commission, Strasbourg,
15 July 1997, DOC/97/6.
• establishment of a sound legal system and institutional infrastructure of the
market, including the regulation of property rights, absence of significant
barriers to market entries (the establishment of new companies) and exits
(bankruptcies and liquidations) and free competition;
• macroeconomic stability (i.e. stabilisation of prices, reducing inflation, GDP
growth, FDI inflows, foreign trade, sustainable public finance);
• broad consensus about the fundamentals of economic policy;
• a well-developed financial sector to channel savings towards productive
investment.
The existence of a market economy requires that equilibrium between supply and
demand is established by the free interplay of market forces. In particular, the
existence of a functioning market economy requires that prices, as well as trade, are
liberalised and that an enforceable legal system, including property rights, is in place.
Macroeconomic stability and consensus on economic policy enhance the performance
of a market economy. A well-developed financial sector and the absence of any
significant barriers to market entry and exit improve the efficiency of the economy.
According to the European Commission the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union requires:
• a stable macroeconomic framework, but allowing economic agents to make
decisions in a climate of predictability; 
• a sufficient amount, at appropriate costs, of human and physical capital, including
infrastructure, education and research, and future developments in this field;
• the extent to which government policy and legislation influence
competitiveness through trade policy, competition policy, state aids, support
for SMEs, etc.;
• the proportion of small firms in the economy, partly because small firms tend
to benefit more from improved market access, and partly because a
dominance of large firms could indicate a greater reluctance to adjust;
• the degree and the pace of trade integration a country achieves with the Union
before enlargement. This applies both to the volume and the nature of goods
already traded with member states. According to the Commission an economy
will be better able to take on the obligations of membership the higher the
degree of economic integration it achieves with the Union before accession;
• State enterprises need to be restructured and all enterprises need to invest to
improve their efficiency. Furthermore, the more access enterprises have to
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outside finance and the more successful they are at restructuring and
innovating, the greater their capacity will be to adapt. 
1.2.1. Tracking Points in the Process of Candidates States Fulfilling
the Economic Criteria 
This part analyses the economic criteria for EU membership and evaluates the
conditions for their fulfilment. It also deciphers the economic criteria, looking in
detail into the economic sub-criteria, explaining the important elements of each and
their role in the overall preparation of the candidate countries for EU membership.
Reviews of the evaluation of the economic criteria within a certain timeframe are then
presented. The key stance here is the “Opinion11 on potential candidates” provided by
the European Commission.
Analysis covers the period up to the year when Progress Reports12 positively
assessed the fulfilment of the economic criteria of the candidate countries and
qualified them as ready to eventually become members of the EU (as in the case of
Poland, Lithuania and Romania). Croatia and BH are analysed up till present (2006).
Within this timeframe we have attempted to point out the steps, both in terms of the
achievements and weaknesses of the analysed countries in the area of economic
sub-criteria. For examination purposes, we have chosen Poland, Romania, Lithuania
and Croatia as benchmarks for BH, taking into account their record, progress in
economic transformation, and other characteristics (see Benchmark Selection for
Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The preconditions of the economic sub-criteria should not be regarded as a simple
checklist. It is the interplay and interaction of all the conditions and their mutually
reinforcing effects on the economy that are pertinent. There is also an important time
dimension involved here; meeting the economic criteria requires, certainly in the case
of transition economies, deep and lasting structural reforms that take time to be
accomplished. The issue of track record, which was one of the factors considered by
the European Commission, becomes then highly relevant. In this context, track record
means the irreversible, sustained and verifiable implementation of reforms and
policies over a period long enough to allow for a permanent change in the
expectations and behaviour of economic agents and the assessment that the
achievements will be lasting. 
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Applications”.
12 See the list of Regular Reports and Progress Reports in the references to the report.
Regarding the economic criteria, the Commission follows the same methodology
in each Opinion and Regular Report on candidate countries. Opinions contain the
first assessment of the candidate countries with respect to the criteria set by the
European Council in 1993 and methodology implied by the European Commission in
Agenda 200013. The method used in preparing the Opinions is to analyse the situation
in each candidate country in the medium term perspective, taking into account
progress accomplished and reforms already under way. The Commission then
examines progress achieved during each year in order to arrive at an evaluation of the
total achievement. In other words, in contrast to the Avis, which examined all
Copenhagen criteria in detail and looked at developments over several years in order
to assess readiness for accession, the annual Progress Reports focus on those areas
where some improvements could still be made and on the economic developments of
the last twelve months, using the previous year’s assessment as a base. 
In Agenda 2000 the Commission sets out its methodology for assessing the
Copenhagen economic criteria, although not including any quantitative benchmarks,
together with detailed Opinions (Avis) on each of the future candidate countries14. We
may assume that the sub-criterion for the existence of a market economy has to be met
to gain acceptance to join the EU, whereas the second criterion – the capacity to
withstand competitive pressures and market forces within the Union – must be met after
accession. The necessary evaluation of the latter is more difficult than for the first
sub-criterion. Taking into account Commission understanding it is assessed on the basis
of the following factors: on the one hand, a comprehensive view needs to be taken
including a considerable number of factors and on the other hand, an assessment of
future developments needs to be made. A key question is whether firms have the
necessary capacity to adapt, and whether their environment supports further adaptation. 
In this part of the report we want to present the economic situation of Poland,
Lithuania, Romania and Croatia in a year when, for the first time, the evaluation
according to Copenhagen criteria was made to show the stage of advancement when
comparing to the BH case. The table represents the benchmark analysis of economic
criteria fulfilment and main obstacles according to specific country assessment of the
European Commission included in Opinions. None of the applicant countries fully met
the two economic conditions of Copenhagen at its first assessment year, although it was
stated that Poland and Croatia should be able to do so in medium term perspective if
the reform track and tight economic policy would have been continued. The
Commission found that only Poland and Croatia could be considered functioning
market economies, even if some important features, such as capital markets, still needed
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13 “Agenda 2000 communication, volume I: for wider and stronger Union”, European Commission, Strasbourg,
15 July 1997, DOC/97/6.
14 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
to mature and develop further. Lithuania and Romania made substantial progress and
should have been able to meet the first economic criterion within 4-5 years. For both
countries, the main challenge was to strengthen the implementation of their legal and
institutional reforms and to avert the risk of further macroeconomic instability. 
The analysis conducted by the Commission based the Opinions led to the
following overall picture that is common to all the benchmark countries:
• Trade integration and FDI have progressed substantially (except for Romania
and BH). However, in Romania, there has been a reversal from initial trade
liberalisation, mainly for macroeconomic reasons; 
• The functioning of capital markets and competition rules has been improving
everywhere, but is generally still far from satisfactory; 
• The state of infrastructure remained poor (except for Croatia); 
• Wage levels were still well below EU levels; 
• Privatisation has progressed at different rates and the process remains to be
completed. 
• Most applicants needed or still need to restructure large state-owned industries,
which dominate local economies and tend to be very hard to reform for both
social and economic reasons.
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Table 4: Timeframe of economic criteria fulfilment by Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia
as a benchmark to Bosnia and Herzegovina and their main obstacles indicated
 Copenhagen’s
economic criteria
 Poland  Lithuania  Romania  Croatia  BH
 Country specific
(main obstacles)
 Economic
structure:
(1) substantial
informal sector;
(2) disparity
between
the contribution
of the agricultural
sector to GDP
and its
share in total
employment
 Social developments:
(1) high unemployment
rate of over 16% in 1996;
(2) low level of enterprise
restructuring and slow
privatisation as
a consequence of a lack
of capital, resulting from
the relatively low level
of foreign direct
investment and
the weakness of the
banking sector
 In general difficulty
in fulfilling
sub-criterion: Capacity
to withstand competitive
pressure and market
forces within the Union:
as well as (1) regional
and sector disparities
in development;
(2) low FDI inflow
 (1) Unemployment;
(2) significant
shadow economy
after 1995
armed conflict
 1) Disparities in laws
and economic
policies between two
Entities;
(2) macroeconomic 
stability: policy
making remains
strongly influenced
by the international
community; (3) trade
deficit of over 50%
of GDP in 2005; (4)
high unemployment
of 44% in 2005
 Sub-criterion:
regarded as
functioning market
economy, including
 First year
of assessment
(Avis 1997)
 4th year of assessment
(Regular Report 2000)
 4th year of assessment
(Regular Report 2000)
 First year
of assessmen
(Avis 2004)
 Not yet (SAP
Progress Report
2005)
 price liberalisation   Some prices stilladministered  
 Administered
prices continue
to play a role
 Regulated prices
largely prevail for
 utilities
and infrastructure
 trade liberalisation   
 In 1996 substantial
trade restrictions
introduced
  
 market entry
and exit
 
 Bankruptcy
and competition
law, property law
 Severe limits to free
entry and exit
in specific economic
activities
 Barriers remain
 Enterprises are still
hampered by
boundaries between
the entities, a weak
entrepreneurial
 climate
and bureaucratic
procedures
In the Opinion, Poland was defined as a functioning market economy due to its
widespread price and trade liberalisation, with an economy that had been successfully
stabilised15 and its full commitment to this policy line maintained throughout changes
in government. Still, in order to guarantee longer-term stability, pension and social
security systems needed to be reformed and a continuation of the progress made in key
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Source: On the basis of EC Opinions and Regular/Progress Reports on Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Table 4 (continued): Timeframe of economic criteria fulfilment by Poland, Lithuania, Romania,
Croatia as a benchmark to Bosnia and Herzegovina and their main obstacles indicated
 Copenhagen’s
economic criteria
 Poland  Lithuania  Romania  Croatia  BH
 legal system   Not adequate  Not adequate
 (1) slow
and inefficient 
ourt proceedings;
(2) low administrative
and professional
capacity
 
 macroeconomic
stability
 
 Low budget constraints
(large current
 account deficit
 -12.1% of GDP in 1998)
 Not stable; widely
 fluctuating
performances in term
of growth, inflation
and unemployment
  
 consensus
on economic policy    
 Increasing political
consensus
 Increasing political 
consensus
 financial sector  
 Undercapitalized
and state-owned
bank sector
 Dominated by
state-owned banks
  
 transformation/
privatisation
process
 
 Large number
of enterprises still
partly state-owned;
low level of enterprise
restructuring
 Slow development
of private sector
 State is still
predominant
in several sectors
of the economy
 Slow pace reflecting
weak political will
and poor financial
situation of many
companies (private
sector activity
reached 55%
of GDP in 2005)
 Sub-criterion:
capacity to withstand
competitive pressure
and market forces
within the EU,
including
 6th year
of assessment
(Regular
report 2002)
 6th year of assessment
(Regular report 2002)
 9th year of assessment
(Regular report 2005)
 Not yet
(Progress Report
2006)
 Not yet
(SAP Progress
Report 2006)
 macroeconomic
stability
for economic
agents
  Low predictability  Low stabilityand predictability
 The level of state
aid and support to 
specific sectors 
is still considerable 
while transparency
 remains low
 Threats
to macroeconomic
 stability
are mounting
 human
and physical
capital
 (1) increase R&D
public expenditure,
(2) no program
for technology
transfer;
(3) agriculture
structure reform;
(4) transport
infrastructure
development
 Agriculture reform  
 Shortcomings
such as outdated
curricula, low
quality teaching
and poor
equipments
 (1) only 43% of the
population being
employed in
the formal economy;
 (2) substantial
mismatches between
 the labour market
and the knowledge
provided
by education
 government policy
and legislation
influence on
competitiveness
  
 Significant degree
of government
interference
  State involvement remains substantial
 proportion of small
firms trade
integration
  Low level
of entrepreneurship
   SME sector
still small
15 By 1992 the GDP growth had already started and has continued since (6.0% in 1996). The budget deficit was
reduced to below 3% of GDP and the debt-servicing burden, after rescheduling agreed in 1991, was being
steadily reduced. Inflation rates declined, but still stood at 19.9% in 1996. GDP per capita was about 31% of
the EU average in 1996, for a population of 38.6 million.
areas of the economic transformation, as well as economic and social development,
was necessary. Financial services were largely underdeveloped until 1997. The
capacity to cope with competitive pressure required a more stable macroeconomic
framework within which individual enterprises could make independent decisions in a
climate of a reasonable level of predictability. The main indicators of Poland’s
competitiveness achieved already by then were: a high percentage of trade integration
with the EU and good performance of enterprises, especially of SMEs. Further
improvements were needed in restructuring more state enterprises, such as shipyards
and chemical plants as well as those operating in the coal, steel and defence industries.
Although Poland’s workforce was relatively highly educated, an increase in R&D
public expenditure was needed, as was the establishment of a programme of
technology transfers and reductions in the percentage of the labour force employed in
the agricultural sector, as its productivity per capita was low.
To sum up, according to the 1997 Avis, “Poland should be well able to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term starting
from 199716, provided that it would maintain the pace of restructuring and keep the
economy open”. Growth and investment were strong. The rise in unit labour costs in
the manufacturing sector was moderate. Inflows of foreign direct investment
accelerated. However, the privatisation process was not over. The main problem was
that of the larger state-owned companies, where management failure in the face of
foreign competition could have serious negative consequences. The agriculture sector
also needed to be modernised17 and there were some reversals in trade policy18.
In the case of Lithuania, the Commission gave no positive assessment as far as
being a market economy in the first year. Improvements should be made to the labour
market by addressing the high unemployment. The management of public finances
should be improved, in particular by addressing, at the municipal level, the
accumulation of expenditure arrears. Furthermore, the completion of pension reform,
with the planned introduction of a funded compulsory pension scheme, should make
public finances more sustainable in the long term and support the development of
financial markets. In addition, strengthening administrative and judicial capacity and
simplifying procedures in areas relevant for the business sector, including in
bankruptcy and enterprise restructuring, would enhance market entry and exit of
companies. Worth mentioning is the fact that irrespective of the rather negative first
judgment of the Commission on Lithuania’s economic development, the country
managed to catch up with reforms and improve its macroeconomic situation
sufficiently to join the EU in 2004 together with Poland.
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16 Avis on Poland’s political and economic situation; Agenda 2000, 1997, p. 32.
17 In 1997 the agricultural sector employed 27% of the labour force, and accounted for 6.6% of Gross Value
Added, ibidem, p. 21.
18 In 1997, 70% of Poland’s exports were directed to the EU, and 65% of its import originated in the EU, ibidem, p. 22.
In the case of Romania, the Commission was reluctant to form a definitive judgment
on the country’s ability to fulfil the economic criteria some years ahead of prospective
membership. Evaluation of competitiveness was made difficult because the major
reforms had been launched shortly before assessment, which, according to Commission
rules, could not yet be taken into account. In this respect, Romania offered a contrasting
situation: the existing economic structure pointed to very important structural
weaknesses, while the reforms that were announced at the beginning of 1997 could have
had a very positive impact in a relatively short period of time, especially if rapid
privatisation could be achieved and FDIs be forthcoming. Nevertheless, the Commission
identified a number of features of Romania’s development that provided some
indications of its probable capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the EU. Both the industrial and agricultural sectors needed to undergo major
structural transformation. The production base in industry in 1997 relied to a large
extent, although not exclusively, on sectors with very high energy intensity, or which
were strongly dependent on imported raw materials, or were the object of exercises of
capacity reduction within the EU. Given Romania’s labour costs and skilled workforce,
specialisation in these sectors (metal-working, chemicals, shipbuilding, machine
building) was not necessarily a bad strategy, provided of course that products were
adapted to the needs, standards and quality requirements of Western markets.
Furthermore, many of the large state-owned enterprises benefited from direct and
indirect subsidies, which have slowed or even hampered their necessary adaptation and
modernisation. A diversification of the industrial base towards lighter industries,
entailing the creation of a large number of new SMEs and increased participation of
foreign capital and know-how, was strongly recommended to Romania to adjust to the
restructuring of large enterprises. As for agriculture, though it was neglected in recent
decades, already represented in 1997 a potentially important source of comparative
advantage for Romania, which was a substantial exporter to European and world
markets before the second World War. However, the process of modernisation of the
agricultural sector required a policy aimed at stimulating investments both in the
farming sector and in the food industry. FDI was low for a country the size of Romania:
increasing the chances that Romanian producers will be able to withstand competition
from high-quality, high-standard EU goods and improving the level of skills in the
economy calls for much bigger inflows of FDI.
In 2004, observing progress made in development, the Commission acknowledged
that since the Opinion’s publication economic structure and performance had
improved significantly, although Romania was allowed to join the EU no earlier than
three years after the first wave of CEE enlargement. Macroeconomic stability was
achieved and fundamental economic reforms were carried out, while the Romanian
authorities’ commitment to the economic requirements of EU accession was eventually
sustained. Nevertheless, further improvements could have been made in sustaining
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macroeconomic stability and in deepening structural reforms. Priority should have
been given to enforcing financial discipline and improving the financial performance
of public enterprises. The privatisation process should be accomplished. Substantial
progress in the functioning of the judiciary and the public administration, including an
even and predictable application of law, was still required to create an enabling
business environment with a level playing field.
As for Croatia, when first assessed in 2004 it was particularly important to
acknowledge the increasing political consensus on the essentials of economic policy
(which is also the case in BH). According to the Commission, the Croatian economy
had achieved a considerable degree of macroeconomic stability with low inflation.
Enhanced economic stability and structural reforms undertaken to date had
permitted market mechanisms to operate. This went in particular for the liberalisation
of prices and trade as well as for privatisation, albeit to a lesser extent. Croatia was
characterised by a relatively well-educated labour force and good road transport and
telecommunications infrastructure. The country had a well developed banking sector
and a competitive tourism industry. Croatia’s economy was already well integrated
with that of the EU. However, the working of market mechanisms still needed some
improvement. In particular, the performance of the judicial sector needed to be
enhanced and high administrative burdens as well as incomplete systems of cadastre
and land registry need to be addressed. Enterprise restructuring and privatisation
were slower than expected and some large state and formerly socially-owned
enterprises still played an important role in the economy. In particular, the
shipbuilding and agriculture sectors needed to be modernised. The necessary reforms
of the fiscal and social security systems as well as the public administration were not
completed and fiscal consolidation needed to be pursued. Full integration in the single
market and the adoption of the acquis would, at this stage, cause difficulties for a
number of sectors in withstanding competition within the single market. 
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet have a formal candidate country
status and therefore no Opinion has been developed by the Commission, it is assessed
according to the Copenhagen criteria within Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP) starting from the 2005 Progress Report. According to the Commission in 2005
the BH economy operated only to a limited degree within the framework of
functioning market principles. Further reform efforts were called for as necessary to
address the serious shortcomings in the competitiveness of the economy. To maintain
macroeconomic stability and safeguard the sustainability of the currency board, a
prudent macroeconomic policy mix is a priority. In order to strengthen the productive
base of the economy, the largely loss-making corporate sector must be urgently and
fundamentally restructured and privatisation accelerated. In addition, actions to
reduce overall government interference in the economy and improve the business
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climate are essential. The flexibility of the labour market should be enhanced and the
judicial system, in particular the handling of bankruptcies and property rights,
strengthened. To successfully manage the fiscal challenges, coordination and
analytical capabilities need to be improved and the size of public expenditures be
reduced in real terms. These demanding tasks require firm political commitment and
cooperation between different levels of government. In general, the functioning of
market forces is hampered by the strong influence of the public sector in the economy
and the weak business environment and legal climate. Despite some improvements,
markets are also sometimes fragmented between entities.
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A notable achievement of the period since the end of the conflict in 1995 was
macroeconomic stabilisation. The currency board system allowed inflation to be
reduced and subsequently kept at very low levels, and the fiscal position has improved
considerably over the last couple of years (though the starting point was very far from
any kind of sustainable fiscal deficit). The significant acceleration in inflation in 2006
is partly explained by the one-off effects of VAT introduction in January 2006 and thus
should not be a source of major concern, although some vigilance is needed.
Table 5 presents selected economic indicators for BH between 2002 and 2006. One
should remember that the very low quality of available statistics and unavailability of
some key indicators makes the reported figures only indicative and subject to
substantial margins of error. In particular, the level of unrecorded economic activity
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2. Economic Situation and Trends
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Notes: Unemployment data are available as estimates for specific periods only and are subject to wide
margins of error (labour force surveys comparable to those carried out in EU countries have not yet been
implemented in BH). 
* This assumes 17% of GDP of debt to settle domestic claims against the government. 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook database, Sept. 2006, IMF (2006), World Bank (2005a).
Table 5: Selected Economic Indicators for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002-2005
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006(proj.)
 General macroeconomic indicators      
 GDP growth (%)  5.3  4.4  6.2  5.0  5.5
 CPI (period average)  0.3  0.6  0.3  1.9  6
 Index of industrial production growth (%)  11.6  3.0  13.6  11.0  7.4
 Unemployment rate  21.4  ..  ..  ..  ..
 Self reported unemployment rate  31.2  30.4  ..  ..  ..
      
 Fiscal indicators      
 General government overall balance (% GDP)  -3.3  -2  -0.4  0.9  0.7
 Public debt  34.8  30.6  28.1  31.7  48.2 (*)
      
 Balance of Payments      
 Current account balance (% GDP)  -19.1  -20.9  -19.3  -21.3  -17
 Current account balance (million US $)  -1252  -1444  -1437  -1695  -1523
 Trade balance (million US $)  -3291  -3378  -3306  -3558  -3426
remains large in comparison with other European transition countries, though it may
be similar to some of the CIS economies (see 1.1.1 The Issues of Measurement). 
From the perspective of meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the following
macroeconomic issues have been identified as requiring more attention and are
discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections:
• labour market developments
• foreign trade performance
• structural reforms, including privatisation 
Clearly, this list is not exhaustive. There are several other issues that may turn out
to be crucial for BH’s ability to strengthen the functioning of its market economy and
cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU in an
environment defined by the internal market acquis. There are also very strong
inter-linkages between various spheres of economic institutions, policies and
segments of the economy and slippages in some dimensions have repercussions
elsewhere. The above list is therefore best understood as indicating identified
bottlenecks at the current stage of BH’s macroeconomic development. Key
microeconomic issues are discussed in Part 4 of the report. Finally it is worth
recalling that the political structure of the country and political dynamics may turn
out to be crucial for both microeconomic and macroeconomic developments.
However, these issues lie outside the scope of this report19.
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19 The current political system of the country (which played a decisive role in ensuring peaceful development
during the decade after Dayton) creates problems and likely increases the costs of further reforms needed on
the road to integration with EU structures. This assessment is shared by most observers and has also been
acknowledged in official EU documents. The European Commission (2005, pp. 9-10) states that: “(…) the
adequacy of the Dayton constitutional system to the present circumstances is frequently questioned both
within and outside the country. It is widely considered that the structures deriving from the DPA are too
complex and fiscally unsustainable. (…) The current set-up does not support swift decision-making and
hampers reform implementation. This undermines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s possibilities to make rapid
progress on its way towards the EU. Despite considerable achievements towards the strengthening of state
institutions, major reforms continue to be delayed by divergences within state institutions and between the
central state and the Entities (FBH and RS). Attempts to create new state structures or to transfer
competences to the state level are often perceived as undermining the Entities and their sustainability. This
mistrust towards any transfer of responsibilities from the FBH and RS level or canton level to the central
authorities is a major obstacle to any serious move towards a comprehensive and sustainable reform of the
institutions and the constitutional order. ” See also, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Addressing Fiscal Challenges
and Enhancing Growth Prospects” by the World Bank, September 2006.
2.1. Labour Market
The World Bank’s (2005a) most comprehensive recent review of labour market
issues in BH concludes that the three key challenges in this field are low productivity
and relatively high wages in the formal sector of the economy, large (and according
to some sources growing) informal employment and high unemployment. This list
could be extended by adding the low overall employment rate (taking the formal and
informal sectors together) and possibly also the problem of the (in)adequate labour
market-related skills of recent graduates and in the population at large. 
Sustained economic growth in recent years has led to gradual job creation, which
– on the basis of very incomplete data – is estimated at around 4% per annum between
2001 and 2004 (World Bank, 2005a). However, the employment rate appears still low
by international standards (although probably higher than in Turkey, for instance, and
not much lower than in the worst performers among the NMS8 and other candidate
countries groups). Moreover, much of job creation appears to have occurred in the
informal sector. Informal employment accounted for up to as much as 42% of total
employment, with somewhat higher rates in Republika Srpska. While these figures
may look very bad, one should bear in mind that much of this informal employment
is concentrated in agriculture. From this perspective the experience of BH is not that
different from trends observed for example in Romania (Paczynski et al, 2007). In
Romania, delayed economic restructuring leading to job losses of less skilled and
older workers, coupled with availability of land (small plots), have resulted in
migration flows from urban to rural areas and increasing employment in subsistence
agriculture. This survival strategy has helped to fend off unemployment rises in urban
areas. The hypothesis that a somewhat similar trend might have occurred in BH may
be very difficult to test given the inadequacies of statistical information on the labour
market in BH, however. Still, during the 2001-2004 period substantial job shedding
from state owned enterprises (SOE) took place. According to the same source, the
SOE share of total employment fell from 37% to around 20%.
The CBBH (2006) reported the results of a labour force survey (LFS) carried in
April 2006. An estimated 811,000 people were employed and 366,000 unemployed,
according to the survey. This implies an activity rate close to 75%, and employment
rate of just above 51% (both calculated relative to the 15-64 population) and a 31%
unemployment rate20. While these estimates should be treated with caution they
nevertheless allow a comparison with EU countries. BH’s activity rate reported in
the survey appears very high by EU standards, well above EU25 or EU15 averages
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20 The CBBH (2006) instead reported employment rates for the whole population, which is a rather unusual
practice. Data on the total population aged 15-64 at end June 2006 (1,576,800 people) were taken from the
BH Federal Statistical Office.
of 70.4% and 71.5%, respectively. In contrast, the employment rate is far higher
than average levels of 64.6% in EU25 and 65.9% in EU15 in the same quarter. The
two EU countries with lowest employment rates (Poland and Malta) still had
employment rates at around 54%, 3 percentage points above the BH level. However,
Turkey, a EU candidate country is characterised by an even lower employment rate
– in 2005, it averaged at around 46%. While the low employment rate in BH
estimated in the survey is not surprising, the estimated unemployment rate and thus
also activity rates, appear suspiciously high. Lack of detailed information on the
construction of the LFS make any comments highly speculative here, but it may be
that the definition of unemployment was set rather broadly, thus encompassing
people who in fact are not actively seeking employment. Interestingly, LFS-based
unemployment was very close to registered unemployment in 2Q 2006 (around
351,000 people). This may suggest that all people who are registered as unemployed
declared themselves as de facto unemployed in the survey irrespective of the their
actual status. An in-depth analysis of this problem may be very interesting to pursue
but is beyond the scope of this report. 
Nominal (euro) wages in BH are high in a regional comparison. In particular,
they are higher than wages in Bulgaria and Romania. BH has also seen continuous,
albeit not very fast, real wage growth in recent years. With relatively low productivity
levels this makes it very difficult for BH producers to compete with companies relying
on production based elsewhere in the region. However, one should note that analysis
of company-level data carried in Part IV draws a more optimistic picture (bearing in
mind that the quality of data is a problem the decisive assessment may require more
detailed analysis). The recent IMF country report (IMF, 2006) also confirms that
signals related to productivity – real wage trends are mixed. 
Another problem (which applies to several other dimensions of economic
development) relates to diverging patterns of labour market legislation and regulations
in RS and FBH, which risk maintaining a de-facto dual labour market in the country. 
2.2. International Competitiveness and Export Performance
BH economic growth has in the past been driven by domestic demand, with
consumption and investment substantially supported by foreign aid flows. International
competitiveness has been weak, with strongly rising imports and a lacklustre export
performance. The export/import ratio declined to only 25% in 2002, with the trade
deficit close to 55% of GDP (excluding estimates of unregistered economic activities).
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Since 2003, the situation has started to gradually improve. Exports have visibly
accelerated, expanding by more than 20% annually since 2004 (see Table 6). This
has coincided with a stabilisation of imports. Consequently, the export/import ratio
improved to 34% in 2005 and around 45% in 2006. An important caveat concerning
foreign trade data for 2005 and 2006 is that the introduction of VAT in January 2006
significantly changed the incentives to report exports and imports. VAT
introduction induced a shift in registered imports from early 2006 to end-2005 and
a delay in reporting exports – from end-2005 to early 2006. Also, since 2006
incentives to report exports have generally been higher than before. This implies
that analysis of the relevant data requires caution and a comparison of broad trends
in 2005-2006 with 2004 is more appropriate. This still suggests an ongoing
improvement in exports and moderation of import growth. 
The recent improvement in export performance is certainly encouraging.
Moreover, it is likely to continue at least in the near to medium term (up to 2-3 years),
due to recent large investments in the production capacity of the metal sector.
However, problematic issues for BH’s exports are the narrowness of the export base
and an over-reliance on metals, the global market for which may be very volatile
(Figure 4). Exports are concentrated on exploitation of natural resources and low-skill
labour intensive goods (mineral products, wood and wood products, clothes,
footwear, etc.). Exports are typically little processed and characterised by low value
added and low technology content.
One positive impulse comes from increasing evidence of the incorporation of BH
companies in EU-based supply chains. This is discussed in detail in World Bank
(2005b). The EU is BH’s largest trade partner. The EU has already granted BH
production largely free access for industrial products and negotiations on a SAA were
started in early 2006. The experience of other European transition countries suggests
that the EU will continue to be the dominant foreign trade partner for BH and that
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Note: GDP values taken for calculations of GDP shares exclude estimates of unregistered economy.
Additionally, current account data likely underestimate the inflow of remittances. The IMF (2006) concluded
that true current account deficits have likely been in the range 6-14% of GDP for the last few years.
Source: CBBH.
Table 6: Selected indicators for BH foreign trade based on BoP statistics, 2001-2006
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  1-3Q 2006
 Imports of goods (billions, euro)  4.58  4.69  4.97  5.35  6.09  4.32
 Imports – annual growth rate (%)  8.3  2.5  6.0  7.6  13.8  0.6
 Exports of goods (billions, euro)  1.27  1.17  1.30  1.68  2.09  1.98
 Exports – annual growth rate (%)  3.4  -7.9  11.5  28.7  24.5  31.3
 Trade balance (millions, euro)  -3.31  -3.52  -3.67  -3.68  -4.01  -2.34
 Trade balance (% GDP)  -54.3  -54.5  -53.9  -49.1  -49.7  
 Current account balance (% GDP)  -13.6  -19.4  -21.2  -19.2  -21.1  
closer integration with the EU, rising competition with EU-based companies,
transfers of know-how and technologies resulting from FDI of EU-based companies
into BH and co-operation within supply chains of large European companies may act
as important catalysts of company restructuring and improvements in the
competitiveness of the overall BH corporate sector. BH also trades heavily with its
neighbours, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. Analysis and recommendations
concerning trade relations with BH’s partners in CEFTA 2006 can be found in
Hadziomeragic et al (2007).
Much of the internal political debate in BH has concentrated on trade deficit
problem with the implicit or explicit policy objective of reducing the trade deficit. Such
a view should be considered as somewhat simplistic. In particular, BH exports are
highly dependent on imported inputs and a high level of processing takes place in BH
before re-export to the EU and other regions. This is not a negative phenomenon and
given the small size of he country, increasing openness (both for imports and exports) is
a natural trend. What is of importance is that BH enterprises successfully compete with
European and global players. Only improved competitiveness can help spur exports and
induce consumers to choose domestically produced rather than imported goods. 
One general conclusion emerging from analysis of BH foreign trade is that
impediments to its development are primarily of a domestic nature, rather than
related to foreign trade policies. In other words, poor export performance can be
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Source: Own calculations based on CBBH data.
Figure 4: Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina exports, 3 quarters 2006 (percentage share in
total exports)
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linked to a sub-par investment climate, difficult conditions for doing business, a rigid
labour market, high taxation on registered economic activity (and a large unregistered
economy), limited know-how and outdated technology in BH companies, etc. Such a
view can also be supported by the experience of the EU new member states (NMS8)
over the last decade. Damijan et al (2006) analyse the outstanding export performance
of the NMS during 1990-2004 and suggest that this can be explained by improving
domestic supply capacity, which in turn was most strongly boosted by building a
stable institutional set-up, structural reforms and FDI inflows. Hadziomeragic et al
(2007) discuss these issues in more detail. 
2.3. Macroeconomic Outlook – a Comparative Perspective
This section speculates on the macroeconomic parameters that BH would need to
achieve at the moment of its eventual EU accession and the policies that could lead to
such macroeconomic outcomes. The analysis builds on analogies with the history of
the 2004 and 2007 waves of EU enlargement.
Firstly, maintaining a sustainable macroeconomic stability is a necessary
precondition on the road to EU accession. The currency board arrangement in BH
has allowed for inflation stabilisation. It has also strongly reduced the real effective
exchange volatility in the past and is likely to play such a role in the future – possibly
until adoption of the euro at some stage. This is not synonymous with stating that the
currency board does not cause any problems for the BH economy. No single exchange
rate and monetary regime is free from drawbacks. The point is rather that for a small,
open, European economy trading mostly with euro-zone countries or countries with
stable currencies against the euro, maintaining a peg is the best option. The
experiences of the Baltic countries, which have opted for a similar exchange rate
arrangement since early 1990s, and the experience of Bulgaria - which switched to a
currency board after a major crisis in 1996-1997 - is quite encouraging in this respect.
The experience of the NMS also highlights the role of the fiscal position, which is
particularly important in smaller countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. Of key
concern is not only keeping the fiscal position close to balance in the medium term,
but the size and structure of fiscal expenditures. The example of Lithuanian fiscal
reforms during 1999-2002 can be particularly interesting from the BH perspective. In
the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis of August 1998, Lithuania (then operating
a dollar-based currency board) found itself on the verge of a financial crisis. The
authorities reacted with a significant tightening of fiscal policy – mostly via
expenditure cuts and not tax rises. The introduced measures were quite exceptional
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in some instances – for example, forced unpaid holidays in the government sector.
This fiscal contraction arguably played a role in the strong rebound of economic
growth in the subsequent period, which was driven by private demand and exports.
Christensen (2005) notes that supply-side factors, such as wage moderation following
the public sector wage freeze and cuts in social benefits, played an important role in
spurring both investments and exports. 
An important element of the overall reform package is privatisation. At present,
BH has the lowest private sector share of GDP among non-CIS transition countries
(EBRD, 2006). However, the experience of other transition countries suggests that the
privatisation process can be relatively fast provided there is sufficient political will.
Thus, in the 5-10 year horizon, the currently little advanced privatisation agenda may
not matter that much.
The conditions for running business need to be substantially improved so that
domestic and foreign investors will choose to set-up and run businesses in BH rather
than invest elsewhere in Europe or give up entrepreneurial activities. One important
dimension of the business climate is the existence of a transparent and stable legal and
regulatory framework. In this field, the challenge for BH is made more difficult by the
very complicated internal political and institutional set-up of the country. A
comparison of the experience of NMS and EU accession countries with other
transition economies confirms that institutional reforms are often much more difficult
to implement than liberalisation and macroeconomic stabilisation.
The EU provides a very useful benchmark for aligning the legal and institutional
framework for market functioning. Perhaps the most important factor is that
requirements related to the EU accession have served as an external force motivating
authorities to carry unpopular reforms. In BH, two issues are worth highlighting.
Firstly, BH is relatively less developed than other countries when they started
institutional reforms aimed at supporting EU integration. Secondly, BH has one of the
most complicated political and institutional structures of these countries. This implies
that if new and reformed institutions are to be given a chance of effective functioning
the applied solutions need to be as simple as possible. 
So, what are BH’s macroeconomic prospects for the next 5-10 years? The arguments
presented above and elsewhere in this report point to the key role of domestic reforms in
determining the pace of development and catch-up with the EU. The optimistic scenario
assumes a coherent set of economic policies maintaining macroeconomic stability (in
particular improving medium-term fiscal prospects), reducing the tax and regulatory
burden on the economy, thus allowing for a reduction in the scale of unregistered
economic activity. Easing of conditions for doing business, coupled with productivity
gains and real wage restraints, could provide a major boost to the external
competitiveness of BH production and a surge in exports. This would be supported by
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rising FDI inflows further encouraged by the prospects of eventual EU accession. In such
an environment, BH could perhaps reach potential growth similar to levels observed in
the Baltic countries over the recent period. One could further assume that the minimum
development threshold where a country can contemplate EU accession (provided other
conditions are met) is around 35% of GDP per capita calculated in PPP terms – this
roughly coincides with the forecast level in Bulgaria for 2007. 
Taking some additional assumptions on the current values of GDP per capita in
BH measured at purchasing power standards (PPS), one can then observe that in the
optimistic scenario BH could reach a GDP per capital level in PPS equal to around
35% of the EU25 average by 2017, a decade from now (Figure 5)21. The Baltic
countries experienced very fast convergence in GDP per capita levels, as they needed
around seven years to close the gap between their position and the EU25 average by
10 percentage points (e.g. Latvia and Lithuania between 1997 and 2004, Estonia
between 1997 and 2003)22. In other countries, such as Bulgaria and Poland, this
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21 The starting values of GDP per capita in PPS (not provided by Eurostat) were calculated using the assumption
that relative position of BH and Macedonia in the IMF World Economic Outlook database (GDP per capita
at PPP) is identical to the relative position of these two countries in the Eurostat series. This assumption gives
BH GDP per capita in PPS at around 20 percent of EU25 average in 2005-2006.
22 The speed of convergence in GDP per capita measured in purchasing power standards depends not only on
economic growth dynamics but also on price level developments. 
Note: Scenarios are based on the historical speed of GDP per capita at PPS convergence in the Baltic
countries (an around 10 percentage point increase over around seven years), Bulgaria and Poland (an
around 10 percentage point increase over around 10 years) and Macedonia in the period after the 2001
crisis (an around 3 percentage point increase over around six years).See text for more discussion.
Source: Simulations based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database (Sept. 2006) and Eurostat starting
values.
Figure 5: Hypothetical convergence paths: Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP per capita as a
percentage of EU25 GDP per capita in PPS
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Baltic
scenario
Bulgaria-
Poland scenario
Macedonian
scenario
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
20
14
 
20
15
 
20
16
 
20
17
 
20
18
 
20
19
 
20
20
 
20
21
 
20
22
 
20
23
 
20
24
 
20
25
process took around 10 years. This gives a basis for the second scenario (the
“Bulgaria-Poland scenario” in ). In this case, BH reaches around 35% of the EU25’s
GDP per capita by 2021, 15 years from now. The third scenario can be based on the
recent experience of another ex-Yugoslavia country that recently acquired EU
candidate status – Macedonia. The modest growth rates that have been registered in
this country since 2003 imply that that its GDP per capita in PPS is expected to
increase from just above 24% of the EU25 average in 2003 to 27% in 2008. Assuming
a similar pace of convergence for BH (the “Macedonian scenario”) implies that by
2025 BH would not even reach a level of 30% of average EU25 GDP per capita.
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Privatisation process is one of the most important institutional and structural
features of every transition economy and especially relevant from the perspective of
meeting the Copenhagen criteria. 
The main institutions in the privatisation process, investment realisation and
aftercare activities include line ministries, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's
Agency for Privatisation, the Republic of Srpska's Directorate for Privatisation and the
Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BiH. All these report to the respective
parliaments and governments.
Before 1991, before the ownership transition was initiated in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the number of entities owned by the state or with state shareholding stood at 2,508
companies23 and 40 banks24.
The privatisation process officially started with the adoption of a set of laws (e.g.
in the RS, eight relevant laws were adopted in 1998)25. It is important to underline
here that the Privatisation Agencies are responsible exclusively for companies
operating in the economy (excluding banks and financial sector companies). In the
RS, the Privatization Agency is responsible for a total of 1,113 companies, of which
181 are regarded as “strategic.” 
The total estimated value of companies in the process of privatisation has been put
at EUR 11.86 billion (KM 23.3 billion). Privatisation has been carried in parallel in both
the FBH and the RS using somewhat different methods. Both privatisation processes
have been conducted on three levels: small-scale privatisation (up to EUR 150,000, that
is KM 300,000); privatisation of large state-owned companies (over KM 300,000) and
strategic companies. BH has kept in its possession a large portfolio of state-owned
companies and the privatisation of strategic firms has continued to be slow. 
If one takes 2004 as a base year (six years after official start of privatisation), the
following results were achieved: the total value of privatised companies stands at 50%
of total registered companies slated for privatisation. In the RS, KM 4.5 billion worth,
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23 1,395 in the FBH and 1,113 in the RS.
24 27 in the FBH and 13 in the RS.
25 Researchers” interview with Deputy Director of the Directorate for Privatisation of the RS.
3. Privatisation process
or 53% of earmarked companies, were privatised. In the FBH the results were even
poorer, with privatisation bringing in KM 5.3 billion, 39% of the planned level. 
3.1. Mass-Privatisation Impeding Economic Recovery
Voucher privatisation, also known as “mass privatisation,” was based on the
issuance of government vouchers and certificates, which were used as a means of
payment26 in the privatisation process. Each citizen was given certificates based on a
variety of criteria: citizenship, previous working experience in state-owned companies
and war veteran status. The real value of vouchers was reflected on the black market,
selling at only 2-7% of their nominal value. 
On one hand, this system left the FBH without revenues from privatisation and on
the other hand in most cases the buyers turned out to be local businessmen (in many
cases the old management, which brought companies on the edge of bankruptcy), who
neither had sufficient capital to cover their debts, any experience in corporate
restructuring nor a clear strategy for further development of the companies. Voucher
privatisation thus did not lead to realisation of the state’s goals. There was no
significant restructuring effort, as most companies were divided up into smaller
pieces and sold off separately, predominantly as real estate. A good example is that of
the transportation company Autoprevoz Prijedor, which was privatised via a voucher
privatisation scheme back to the old management, which had already failed in
managing the company and continued to do so. The transaction had disastrous results
– all its real estate was now heavily mortgaged, its 183 workers were not receiving
salaries and their social contributions have not paid for the last four years (a sum
amounting to over KM 3 million). In May 2006, the company’s employees went on
strike, which also failed to yield any concrete results, and led in November 2006 to
some of them starting a hunger strike, which then brought the RS government back
in to resolve the problem. The government is thought likely to assess the possibilities
for company restructuring in terms of either repurchasing a majority stake in the
company or initiating bankruptcy procedures27.
Privatisation via tendering procedure has produced radically different results
from those achieved under the voucher system. Companies which had won tenders
have tended to invest in equipment, technology, product development, capacity
building, settling debts and corporate restructuring. Statistical data show growth in
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26 Purchase of the assets, stake or total state capital of the enterprise.
27 Media reports and this researcher’s interview with a representative of the syndicate of the RS.
privatised companies, especially among those sold to large foreign companies or by
local export-oriented ones. In some cases investors have obtained financial support
from the state for debt servicing or improving their working capital (indirect stock
buying) or have formed joint ventures as vehicles to takeover the business. One of the
reasons for this type of decision has been the wish to avoid responsibility for social
issues and old debts. 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) of state-owned companies were concluded on
November 5, 2002. Some of larger companies, both state-owned and syndicated,
requested special status, i.e. that of a strategic company. The major difference in
approach to the privatisation of strategic and other companies was in the criteria that
were applied. In the privatisation of a strategic company, the financial offer is not
usually ranked as the most important factor in evaluation of offers. Instead, the
agency tends to assess the sustainability of the business, including the seriousness of
the partner and his market position.
3.2. Privatization of Strategic Companies
Both governments recognise the importance of strategic companies and have sought
to make decisions to speed up their privatisation in the FBH and the RS. However, there
is still slow progress in preparations for the privatisation of infrastructure and utility
companies, as well as electronic media companies (see Tables 7 and 8).
Before 2004, the FBH laid out a list of 56 strategic companies and by the end of
2004 had privatised 28, or 50%, of them. The RS, likewise, set out a list of 52 strategic
companies for privatisation and by the end of 2004 had privatised 43, or 82%, of them.
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Source: Agency for Privatisation of the FBH and the RS's Directorate for Privatisation.
Table 7: The announced tenders for privatisation of strategic companies
 Year  2001-2002  2003  2004
 RS  21  17  3 Number of Announced Tenders
for Privatisation  FBH  15  3  10
 Total  BH  36  20  13
Source: Agency for Privatisation of the FBH and the RS's Directorate for Privatisation.
Table 8: The annual breakdown of strategic companies' privatisation
 Year  2001  2002  2003  2004
 RS  2  21  17  3 Number of Privatized Companies  FBH  6  9  3  10
 Total  BH  8  30  20  13
Experience has shown that a number of companies of strategic importance for the
government have been the subject of change, and this will increase with time. During
2005-06, progress was made in privatisation and corporate restructuring in the RS,
mostly because of the new government, which has been dedicated to the
implementing further economic transition. Important laws have been adopted by the
RS parliament, including a Securities Law and Investment Fund Law.
3.3. Foreign Direct Investments
BH attracted FDI of EUR 250 million in the first nine months of 2006 (according
to the latest available data28) and FDI is expected to reach EUR 400 million by the end
of the year, up from EUR 330 million in 2005. Aggregate FDI stock per capita should
reach EUR 495 in 2006, 58% went to industry and 16% to the banking sector29. This
level is unsatisfactory, particularly because of the inadequate level of greenfield
investments and slow privatisation process30.
FDI inflows decreased from 7% of GDP in 2005 to 4% of GDP in mid-200631,
mainly as a result of lower privatisation-related inflows. Although from the beginning
of 2006 no significant greenfield investments have been recorded, there are several
projects in contracting phase and one can expect that the mid-term realization of
several strategic investment projects will start in the near future. FDI is likely to rise
to some EUR 1.0 billion in 2007 as stalled privatisations are expected to be restarted
after the election of November 2006 and the formation of a new government32.
During 2006, after the appointment of the new government run by the
Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the RS started several large-scale energy
projects and key industry privatisations, which are expected to bring significant
growth to the economy. The RS initiated long-term projects in the energy sector and
the privatisation of Telekom Srpske, oil refineries at Brod and Modrica and fuel
retailer Petrol, which would radically change the entire economic environment.
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28 The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations publishes FDI statistics every three months and on
annual bases.
29 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels,
08.11.2006, SEC (2006) 1384.
30 Researcher’s interview with representative of the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BH.
31 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Progress Report. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels,
08.11.2006, SEC (2006) 1384.
32 Researcher’s interview with a representative of the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency in BH.
3.4. Effects of the Privatisation Process
In 2005, private sector activity reached 55% of GDP from around 50% in 2004, as
the privatisation process continues to reshape the overall structure of the economy.
As result of restructuring, privatisation and FDI inflows, the BH economy has recorded
high growth rates in the processing and mining industries. Again, as in the banking sector,
only a handful of big companies have impacted on aggregate changes in the overall
economic system, indicative of how sensitive the BH economy is to economic shocks. For
example, industrial output in the RS in January–September 2006 rose by 10.7%
year-on-year33, the increase taking place mainly in wood processing, coal and ore mining34.
There is also a strong correlation between the privatisation process and growth in industrial
production. A significant increase of industrial production in BH was generated by the
following companies: Volkswagen (Sarajevo), Balkala (Jelšingrad), Mital Steel (Zenica),
Global Ispat Coke Industrije (Lukavac), Novi Rudnici (Ljubija) and Vitaminka (Banja
Luka). All these companies were privatized and restructured. As result of the privatization
of Meggle, Dukat, Vegafruit and Vitaminka production of food and beverages increased
1.3% in the FBH and 37% in the RS. Production in the leather sector increased 98% in the
RS, above all because of the clustering of privately owned SMEs: Bema Banja Luka, Odesa
Kotor Varoš, Sanino Derventa (which cooperates with Adidas) and Baja Company
Derventa. In the RS, the tobacco industry registered an increase of 18.3%, mainly due to
the privatisation of and investment in the Tobacco Factory Banjaluka35.
Attempts to increase efficiency are visible in the energy sector, too. BH, together
with the EU, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and
the UNMIK (on behalf of Serbia's southern province of Kosovo) signed a treaty obliging
them to work toward integration of the energy market into the SEE and EU energy
markets. In June 2006, the EFT Group became the first private company to receive an
electricity sales license in BH. Both of these agreements will help integrate the energy
market, as well as increase its competitiveness, with knock on effects for BH’s industry.
3.5. Political Issues Related to Privatisation in 2006
In April 2006, the FBH government analysed and adopted a report by the FBH
Privatisation Agency “Progress and the Results of Privatisation in FBH, 1999-2005”.
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33 Statistical Office of RS; Statistical Agency of BH.
34 Researcher’s interview with the Ministry of Energy, Economy and Development.
35 Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Economic Report 2005 (and draft report for 2006 - unpublished), Economic
Policy Research Unit, 2005-2006.
Revenues reached KM 8.9 billion, including KM 8.5 billion in certificates and KM
0.425 billion in cash. 
In the so-called small privatisation, 258 companies were sold for a combined KM
424 million, while large privatisation of 323 companies yielded revenues of KM 674
million (a total of 1,032 companies). 451 companies were sold by public offer, which
earned KM 7.83 billion in revenue. It meant, 71% realization of the privatisation plan,
or about 40% of total state capital. The remaining state capital amounts to KM 11.16
billion spread over in 348 companies. During 2005, 55 companies and 6,628
employees got new foreign owners.
The Mid-Term Development Strategy’s (MTDS) working groups have defined
timeframes for further development in the privatisation process. The Economic Policy
Planning Unit (which worked out the MTDS), will be part of the Council of Ministers
as of January 1, 2007, which gives weight to its recommendations. According to the
MTDS document, it is expected that privatisation of strategic companies will be
finished by the end of 2007. Furthermore, the same deadline is for defining the strategy
for privatisation of the infrastructure sector. This is particularly important because
companies belonging to this sector require serious restructuring. For example, out of
130 remaining strategic companies in the RS, 50 are public-communal companies for
which privatisation has been halted (the Working Group should provide an opinion on
whether these companies should be privatised and, if so, in which way)36.
One of the problematic issues for the government was the opening of criminal
charges against a previous government that had privatised one of the state owned
banks (Kristal Bank) for a price of EUR 1. The first buyers restructured the bank and
sold it for much higher price to the Austrian state-owned Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank.
Reopening previous privatisations might tarnish BH’s image abroad and impact on
investors’ risk calculations for further BH investments. 
The economy is still encumbered with some legacies of the war, in particular
significant corporate debts, lost markets, inadequate product quality, the non-existent
introduction of new technologies and lack of capacity building. In addition to this,
various lobbies put pressures on the government to accelerate privatisation (an
example of this is Energopetrol’s sale to the INA/MOL consortium). There are still
many (large) state-owned loss-making companies and many privatized companies
have not yet recovered (see Tables 11-13). Privatisation was not successfully
completed and must be aggressively addressed in the coming years.
In 2006, the privatisation process was continued irrespective of the political
debates during the political campaign. In the RS, the Privatisation Directorate has
finalised the privatisation of 38 larger companies. 40% of state owned nominal capital
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36 Researchers’ interview with Deputy Director of the Directorate for Privatisation of RS.
intended for privatisation remains to be privatised, mostly in the utilities and
infrastructure sectors (strategic companies). In the FBH, the results have been less
favourable, with only 13 companies sold. However, approximately 40% of nominal
capital for privatisation remains in the state’s hands – a level similar to the RS. 
In order to speed-up the privatisation process, both governments have been
introducing legislative amendments. The RS government’s amendments allow the sale
of companies through direct negotiations with potential buyers rather than via tenders.
The new law permits enterprises scheduled for privatisation to reschedule their debt.
The companies would be allowed to write-off part of their interest payments and repay
the principal figure in instalments over five years with a two-year grace period. Debt has
highlighted as the biggest problem in the privatisation process to date. Amendments
reflecting changes in the Privatisation Investment Funds have tended to fix problems
created in the past during the voucher privatisation. The new law might give a stimulus
for ownership structure improvement and offers incentives for restructuring of
voucher-privatised companies. Overall, progress in enterprise restructuring has
continued to be slow, although some improvements have been made to the regulatory
framework. In the FBH, the prescribed legal changes have implied that debt can be
rescheduled without any real restructuring of the company, although the corporate
sector strongly needs restructuring, including bankruptcy and liquidation37.
As stock-markets become stronger some regular ownership transfers were
occurring there. For example, in June 2006, the International Investment Fund
Poteza Adriatic Fund from Slovenia and the Pension Fund Prva Pokojninska Druzba
Slovenia took over 41.31% and 5.56%, respectively, of privately owned Nova Banka.
In total, their ownership amounted 50% plus one share in the bank. 
During 2006, the FBH parliament adopted rules and regulations governing bourse
listings. Based on this decision, the FBH government decided in September 2006 to
start offering stakes of local companies on the SEE. As a crucial stakeholder in this
process, the FBH’s Agency for Privatisation has also approved a set of rules for the sale
of state-owned companies on stock exchanges and other public markets. According to
decision-makers, in some cases, for example when state-owned stakes are very small in
a particular company, this is the only possible way of privatisation. Only one strategic
company has been offered via IPO – a 12% of the strategic company Intersped. 
The FBH public sector remains significant (KM 11.16 billion in 348 companies),
this being partially influenced by lack of political will, a complex institutional
decision-making structure and an inadequate legal framework. In January 2006, the
FBH’s Privatisation Agency approved a plan (for the second time in two years) for the
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37 IMF, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2006 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the
Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Bosnia, IMF Country Report No.
06/371, October 2006.
sale of state-owned stakes in 23 (or 24, as stated in some documents) big companies
during 200638. When talking about the privatisation of bigger companies, as originally
planned, most of the companies was supposed to be sold during 2006, but due to
significant delays in the adoption of laws (regulations for full implementation of
amendments on the Law on Privatisation in the FBH) this has been prolonged for the
next 12 months. The basic problem here is regulation of corporate restructuring,
without which privatisation cannot be successfully implemented. Some companies,
e.g. Krivaja (prefabricated houses) and Hepok (agriculture and food production)
would attract investors, but the FBH’s Ministry of Energy, Mining and Industry has
not fulfilled its obligations, failing to pass draft regulations to the government39.
The privatisation process has been rescheduled for the following companies: Zenit
BRO Neum, Šipad eksport-import Sarajevo, Agrokomerc Velika Kladuša, Krivaja
Zavidovići, Aida Tuzla, Željezara Zenica, Hepok Mostar and Tobacco and Cigarettes
Factory Sarajevo. Privatisation has been postponed for the following companies: Stela
Neum, Vitezit Vitez, Soda-so holding Tuzla, veterinary stations in the FBH. 
For this year, the FBH’s Privatisation Agency should privatise the following
companies: Aluminij Mostar, UNIS Sarajevo, Energoinvest Sarajevo, Energoinvest
TDS, Tobacco and Cigarettes Factory Mostar (planned capital support privatization,
characteristic of many companies based on territories with Croatian ruling parties),
KTK Visoko, Hidrogradnja, and Sodium Factory Lukavac (a joint venture, or merging
with another company). Besides these companies, a new schedule anticipating tenders
has been published for the following companies: Žica Sarajevo, Factory of Cardboard
Cazin, Carton Print Stolac and Sarajevo Insurance (awaiting the government’s
decision on method of privatisation – via capital support or some other method). 
Based on the above mentioned documents and decisions, the FBH’s Privatisation
Agency has started preparation of privatisation plans for five companies based on the
new legislation, including engineering group Energoinvest, civil engineering company
Hidrogradnja, the Zenica Mill, the Stella Hotel and cardboard producer Carton Print
Stolac. The complexity of this process, including possible political blocks, has motivated
the agency not to define any timeframes for conducting these processes (see Annex 1).
Faced with slow realisation of its privatisation plans for strategic companies the
agency recently rescheduled strategic companies’ privatisation and decided to
privatise only 12 companies during 2006. Even this plan may be over ambitious given
that some companies are subject to court disputes (for example, wood processing
industry Sipad owns the port in Croatian town of Sibenik, although after several
disputed decisions it is questionable that this is in fact the case).
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39 A media interview with the director of the FBH’s Agency for Privatization, Rešad Žutić, in Nezavisne Novine
Banja Luka on November 6, 2006. For more see business web portal: www.investitor.ba
The Copenhagen criteria requires that the candidate country enterprises would to
develop ability to cope with competitive pressures and forces in the European Union’s
internal market, as well as the whole economy of the applicant country compared to
the economies of EU members. The financial analysis of enterprises provided in this
part of the report concentrates on current situation and identification of the main
trends in microeconomic developments to identify comparative advantages, assess
productivity, and to position the BH enterprise sector towards the potential
competition on the EU markets. 
The financial analysis is detached on the data of 45 enterprises in the FBH and
266 firms listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange (BLSE) identified by branches.
Due to serious data availability limits, the period of analysis for companies listed at
BLSE is much shorter (2004 and 2005) than was in the case of the FBH enterprises’
sample covering the period of 2002-05. Given the various differences in data
reporting, analysed financial indicators for both sets of companies could only be
compared with some caution. Generally speaking, the microeconomic data for BH
face similar problems as national accounts data, which undermines the quality of any
statistical or financial analysis.
4.1. The Enterprise Sector in the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
The financial data of 45 enterprises in the FBH (34 private companies and 11
public ones) covers the period 2002-2005 (see Annex 4). The analysed enterprises are
relatively big in terms of employment, with 42% of them (19 units) having over 250
employees. Average employment in 2005 in the analysed enterprises was 410 workers
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4. Capacity of enterprises to cope
with the competitive pressure
and market forces
(1,268 in the public sector and 165 in the private sector). Average employment in the
analysed firms declined in the relation to 2002, when it was 443 workers (1,327 in the
public sector and 190 in the private sector). The study was of a pioneer character: to
date only analyses of SMEs in BH have been undertaken (by Broadman et al, 2004).
In the sample we still had 60% of medium sized enterprises, which also provided us
with information on business development of smaller size companies. 
The analysed firms have been aggregated by 9 branches: industry (14 units),
mining and quarrying (4), electricity, gas and water supply (2), manufacturing (5),
construction (6), trade and repairs (5), services (5), transportation (3), and
telecommunications (1)40. In 2005, the biggest firms were registered in the public
sector, in electricity, gas and water supply (average employment 3,835 workers) and in
BH Telecom (3,042), which is also publicly owned. We also analysed big enterprises in
the construction sector (average employment in 2005 in public construction was 1,016
and in private construction 348). The smallest (in terms of employment) enterprises
were traditionally registered in services (average employment in 2005 was 37) and in
trade and repairs (45). Thus, as regards the size of enterprise, the sample indicated
many differences among the firms. Concerning ownership, the sample covered only
public firms in the electricity, gas and water supply sector and telecommunications and
only private firms in manufacturing and trade and repairs sectors.
4.1.1. Effectiveness Analysis
The sample of analysed enterprises in the FBH is quite effective in terms of EBIT
(earnings before taxation) and not very effective in terms of net income. Only 40% of
firms indicated a positive net income in 2005 (20% in the public sector and 45% in the
private sector), less than in 2002. All manufacturing firms obtained positive net
income in the whole period under analysis, as did also BH Telecom. There were also
very impressive shares for strong performing firms in construction (two thirds in
2005). A much smaller number of profitable firms was observed in industry (35.5%),
trade (40% - the sample average) and services (only 20%). In mining and quarrying,
electricity and water supply and transportation, as well as public construction and
public services, there was not one profitable firm observed in 2005. 
Looking at the rate of return of the group (EBIT to revenues ratio), performances
of firms appear to be much better, however. The average rate of return was set at a
very impressive level of 11% in 2002 and 9.6% in 2005. In the last three years, the
public sector has been more effective than the private one in terms of this indicator
(an annual average of 10%). However, the most effective was BH Telecom, which as
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a monopoly affected the results of the whole sample. When we exclude it from the
analysis, the average rate of return for the public sector is only 0.5% in 2005, much
lower than in the private sector (7.9% in 2005). The most effective firms are registered
in the private industry and private manufacturing sectors. Private construction firms
also showed reasonably strong effectiveness (a slightly positive annual average at a
level of 1.2%) considering their big size (four out of five private construction firms
employed more than 250 workers). In public industry firms, the efficiency of
economic activity was also positive and even better than among private construction
firms (an annual average of 3%). In mining, electricity, gas and water supply, public
construction, trade and repairs (with the exception of 2005) and services and
transportation there were no positive rates of return observed41. 
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41 On the available financial statement the enterprises did not indicate a negative EBIT. Even if they have losses
they were indicated as zero instead of a negative number. In contrast to the Srpska Republic sample, where
enterprises listed on the Stock Exchange had to report their losses, this practice in the FBH improved the
total rate of return in a statistical sense.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 9: Profitable companies and rate of return (in percent)
  Profitable enterprises  EBIT to revenues ratio
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2002  2003  2004  2005
 Enterprises in FBH  44.4  40.0  42.2  40.0  11.0  9.6  10.4  9.6
 public sector  40.0  40.0  30.0  20.0  10.1  10.3  11.4  10.1
 private sector  45.7  40.0  45.7  45.7  13.9  7.5  7.3  7.9
 Industry  42.9  35.7  35.7  35.7  5.1  7.1  9.0  6.3
 public sector  33.3  33.3  33.3  33.3  1.0  3.7  7.1  3.0
 private sector  45.5  36.4  36.4  36.4  9.4  10.7  11.7  11.5
 Mining and quarrying  25.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  …  0.0  0.0  0.0
 public sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
 private sector  33.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  …  0.0  0.0  0.0
 Electricity, gas and water supply
 (public sector)  50.0  0.0  50.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.0
 Manufacturing 
 (private sector)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  9.8  7.5  7.2  10.3
 Construction  50.0  83.3  83.3  66.7  1.1  0.9  1.0  1.1
 public sector  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
 private sector  60.0  80.0  100.0  80.0  1.6  1.3  1.2  1.2
 Trade and repair 
 (private sector)  20.0  20.0  20.0  40.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  2.6
 Services  20.0  0.0  20.0  20.0  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.1
 public sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
 private sector  25.0  0.0  25.0  25.0  1.7  0.0  0.1  0.1
 Transportation  33.3  33.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0
 public sector  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.0
 private sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
 Telecommunications
 (public sector)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  29.7  28.4  31.4  31.6
Given the effectiveness measure results we are obliged to state that enterprises in the
FBH performed very well. The very effective BH Telecom had the biggest impact on the
obtained results, as did the non-reporting of losses by the analysed firms. In 2005, the
effectiveness of analysed firms declined slightly (from 10.4% in 2004 to 9.6% in 2005),
influenced by a decline in public industry’s rate of return (by 4.1 percentage points). The
percent of profitable firms also diminished, from 42.2% in 2004 to 40% in 2005.
4.1.2. Cost Analysis
The analysed firms reported a very strict policy of cost control. The cost level
indicator (the ratio of total costs to total revenues in percent) was very low and
declining in the period under analysis. 
Private sector firms were more effective in terms of reducing the cost level indicator
than public ones (from 85.6% in 2002 to 79.5% in 2005 in the private sector and for
public sector from 84.5% in 2002 to 85.4% in 2005). The biggest reduction in the cost
level indicator was observed in private manufacturing, by 15 percentage points.
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 10: The cost level indicator and the share of labour costs (in percent)
  Cost level indicator  Labour costs in total costs
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2002  2003  2004  2005
 Enterprises in FBH  84.8  96.4  85.9  83.9  11.9  10.4  10.8  11.1
 public sector  84.5  84.2  87.2  85.4  11.8  11.6  10.2  10.7
 private sector  85.6  134.5  81.5  79.5  12.4  8.1  12.8  12.2
 Industry  77.4  147.9  100.6  92.3  10.8  6.0  8.5  9.0
 public sector  70.9  99.8  113.8  99.1  9.3  6.6  5.7  6.5
 private sector  84.2  199.4  82.2  81.9  12.1  5.7  13.8  13.5
 Mining and quarrying  185.9  120.1  151.5  157.0  10.4  18.5  29.5  17.2
 public sector  521.6  2.8  220.0  …  46.0  …  59.4  …
 private sector  184.1  120.4  148.4  157.0  9.9  15.1  27.5  17.2
 Electricity, gas and water supply
 (public sector)  107.9  111.7  105.3  107.9  10.0  9.5  8.5  8.4
 Manufacturing
 (private sector)  80.5  84.8  71.4  65.6  11.4  10.4  12.3  12.7
 Construction  70.6  73.9  116.0  95.6  21.1  18.6  10.7  9.8
 public sector  27.6  36.5  187.9  111.0  70.7  46.8  12.8  22.5
 private sector  91.3  93.3  96.6  93.4  13.9  12.8  9.6  7.6
 Trade and repair
 (private sector)  70.0  60.1  39.9  51.5  35.2  37.9  57.2  25.5
 Services  114.4  107.9  101.5  99.7  14.6  19.5  16.3  55.6
 public sector  30.4  26.5  29.5  39.2  54.2  67.8  50.9  49.4
 private sector  126.2  120.1  111.4  108.2  13.3  17.9  15.1  55.9
 Transportation  104.7  122.0  119.7  126.3  16.7  14.6  14.4  12.2
 public sector  99.4  98.7  119.7  177.0  14.5  15.4  15.5  16.7
 private sector  108.4  142.9  119.7  112.2  18.1  14.2  13.7  10.2
 Telecommunication
 (public sector)  59.1  42.6  39.8  38.6  15.6  21.8  23.0  26.0
Firms in the FBH also reported a very low share of wages in total costs. This was
approximately 11% in the public sector (annual average) and 10% in the private
sector. This small share of labour costs indicates that costs other than wages were
more important in the production process and in services in the FBH economy as a
whole42. Probably, the costs of materials or energy costs for industry (where an
extremely low share of wages in total costs were noted) are more significant than
wages. Unfortunately, there were no cost breakdowns available for FBH enterprises.
Given the ability of FBH enterprises to reduce the cost level indicator to such a
low level and the low share of wages in total costs, one can conclude that great
potential exists here in the area of improving international competitiveness. Further
analysis of wages and productivity confirms their comparative advantage with partner
countries in terms of low labour costs in the FBH.
4.1.3. Average Wage and Labour Productivity Analysis
The average monthly wage was increasing in FBH firms in nominal terms
throughout the whole period under analysis, from KM 698 (EUR 358) in 2002 to KM
816 (EUR 418) in 2005. The nominal wage increase amounted to 17%. The highest
wages were observed in the public sector as a result of very high wages at BH
Telecom. An elimination of the company from the analysis reduces the average wage
in the public sector to a level of KM 654 (EUR 335) in 2005, which is closer to the
private sector’s level (KM 551, EUR 282). Very high wages were observed in 2005 in
mining (KM 1,096), private services (KM 1,342) and public electricity, gas, and water
supply (KM 941). The lowest wages were observed in public transportation (KM 372)
and public services (KM 446).
The nominal wage increase was supported by impressive labour productivity
growth (total revenues to employment ratio). The total productivity level grew by 27%
(a bigger increase than the nominal wage increase of 14%). Labour productivity was
higher in the public sector thanks to a significantly higher level of labour productivity
in public industry (KM 120,000 in 2005 and in private industry only KM 46,000) and
high productivity in BH Telecom. The labour productivity growth observed in public
industry amounted to 57%. In private manufacturing, productivity grew by almost
8%, in line with impressive employment increases (year on year growth amounted to
35% in 2005). Wages in manufacturing decreased in nominal terms (by 2.6%), which
may suggest that manufacturing entrepreneurs kept their wages more or less stable
and built up their capacity to accumulate for future wage increases. 
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42 For example, in Poland, the share of wages to total costs ranged from 14% in the private sector to 16% in the
public sector in 2005.
Entrepreneurs probably allocate profits for the purpose of investment rather than
current wage increases. This approach is highly required in transition economies in
the early process of building a market economy. This was confirmed by very strong
investment outlay growth and impressive employment growth in manufacturing in
2005. The return of this investment may strongly improve manufacturing and wage
increases in the future43.
Labour productivity was increasing in each sector of the economy with the
exception of services, transportation (in the public sector only) and public
construction. Wage reductions in public construction was rightly supported by a
collapse in labour productivity, which may be considered a reflection of the strong
functioning of market forces in this sector in the FBH.
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43 In the transition economies the average period of positive return of investment and the financial effects on net
income and wages amounted approximately to 2-3 years.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 11: Average monthly wages and labour productivity in enterprises in the FBH
    Average monthly wage in KM  Labour productivity in ths. KM
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2002  2003  2004  2005
 Enterprises in the FBH  698.4  712.7  767.2  816.5  83.1  85.2  99.5  105.3
 public sector  794.4  845.5  922.5  983.3  95.9  103.7  124.2  128.6
 private sector  508.6  494.4  516.4  551.0  57.6  54.7  59.5  68.1
 Industry  496.0  448.1  491.7  504.8  71.5  60.3  69.3  73.2
 public sector  419.4  434.9  586.2  647.7  76.2  79.6  108.2  120.0
 private sector  567.5  456.6  435.4  421.1  67.1  47.9  46.1  45.8
 Mining and quarrying  350.8  483.2  907.9  1096.2  21.7  26.1  24.4  48.7
 public sector  248.1  728.6  841.2  .  1.2  0.6  7.7  .
 private sector  361.2  449.0  918.4  1096.2  23.8  29.6  27.0  48.7
 Electricity, gas and water
supply (public sector)
 773.8  828.2  894.7  940.8  86.0  93.7  120.1  124.8
 Manufacturing 
 (private sector)  674.1  685.2  674.5  659.5  88.4  93.4  92.0  95.3
 Construction  423.5  458.4  496.9  517.6  34.1  40.0  48.0  66.2
 public sector  649.6  602.5  542.5  479.8  39.9  42.3  27.1  23.1
 private sector  337.1  389.3  469.3  539.7  31.8  39.0  60.6  91.4
 Trade and repair 
 (private sector)  340.7  357.7  684.1  560.7  16.6  18.9  36.0  51.3
 Services  580.1  621.4  418.5  1341.6  41.7  35.5  30.3  29.0
 public sector  345.8  356.7  375.4  445.9  25.2  23.8  30.0  27.6
 private sector  640.4  685.3  424.5  1474.3  45.9  38.3  30.3  29.2
 Transportation  428.7  429.9  382.8  376.2  29.4  28.9  26.6  29.2
 public sector  330.0  370.8  342.7  372.0  27.4  29.3  22.1  15.1
 private sector  508.8  481.7  417.8  379.4  31.1  28.5  30.5  39.7
 Telecommunication
 (public sector)  1243.1  1368.4  1429.6  1538.7  162.2  176.5  187.4  183.9
4.1.4. Sales Revenues and Investment Outlay Dynamics
2003 and 2004 showed quite impressive sales revenue and investment outlay
dynamics across the whole sample. In 2004, sales revenues increased by 23% and
investment outlays by 32%. In line with the decline in effectiveness, in 2005 reductions
in both dynamics were observed, although they remained positive. 
Looking at sectors in terms of ownership, sales revenues and investment
dynamics are the most confusing of the whole analysis. It is hard to discern the right
relationship in each particular sector, with the exception of private construction,
private industry and electricity, gas, and water supply firms, where both sales and
investment dynamics in 2005 were positive and quite impressive.
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Figure 6: Year on year percentage changes in employment in selected sectors of the analysed
enterprises in the FBH
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Table 12: Year on year dynamics of sales revenue and investment outlays (in percent)
  Sales revenue dynamics  Investment dynamics 
  2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005
 Enterprises in FBH  9.9  22.9  3.0  13.5  32.1  7.6
 public sector  7.5  21.1  1.6  14.4  33.4  2.8
 private sector  18.2  28.8  7.8  -1.6  0.6  186.0
 Industry  20.8  71.2  18.3  9.8  41.6  100.6
 public sector  24.4  96.9  13.8  -60.3  791.2  -95.7
 private sector  18.3  48.5  24.7  19.9  3.7  198.8
 Mining and quarrying  12.5  -1.6  60.9  0.0  0.0  313.9
 public sector  -8.8  .  .  .  .  .
 private sector  12.6  -6.8  70.6  0.0  0.0  313.9
4.1.5. Return on Assets and Company Liquidity Assessment
Return on assets (ROA) analysis does not show any important message, apart
from its positive level and increasing character across the three sectors outlined in the
previous analysis: manufacturing, public industry and private construction. A positive
ROA in the sample (the ratio of EBIT to total assets in percent) is to a large extent
supported by the fact that companies did not report their losses, giving zero instead
of negative EBIT values. We noted this above in the effectiveness analysis and
indicated there that the results cannot be fully comparable with other samples in this
respect. However, the objective of the ROA analysis, as well as analysis of efficiency,
was observation of trends in the particular sectors. Only in the indicated sectors
(industry, manufacturing, BH Telecom and private construction) were assets utilised
effectively and the advantages stemming from this increased throughout the analysed
period. This also confirms the effectiveness analysis.
Our sample does not indicate a strong current ratio44 (bigger than 2) in any of the
analysed sections, with the exception of public transportation (a very high level of
current assets in this sector in comparison to a low level of current liabilities is the
result of this type of economic activity) and public construction in 2005 (current ratio
57
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – MEETING COPENHAGEN ECONOMIC CRITERIA...
CASE Reports No. 72/2007
44 A current ratio (of current assets to current liabilities) is an indication of a company's ability to meet short-term
debt obligations. The higher the ratio, the more liquid the company. If the current assets of a company are
more than twice its current liabilities, then that company is generally considered to have good short-term
financial strength. If current liabilities exceed current assets, then the company may have problems meeting
its short-term obligations.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 12 (continued): Year on year dynamics of sales revenue and investment outlays (in percent)
  Sales revenue dynamics  Investment dynamics 
  2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005
 Electricity, gas and water
supply (public sector)  3.0  22.6  2.7  14.7  33.0  4.1
 Manufacturing 
 (private sector)  20.0  9.6  -24.7  47.6  56.4  298.3
 Construction  19.7  18.9  26.8  -56.3  -32.0  25.4
 public sector  39.3  -24.6  -20.2  .  .  .
 private sector  11.4  42.1  40.1  -56.3  -32.0  16.6
 Trade and repair 
 (private sector)  34.1  39.3  91.5  0.0  -94.4  -96.3
 Services  118.1  114.1  47.5  0.0  .  .
 public sector  -5.9  9.8  -13.3  0.0  .  .
 private sector  187.6  148.0  63.9  .  .  .
 Transportation  -10.7  -24.2  2.6  0.0  .  .
 public sector  -1.3  -45.9  -28.5  .  .  .
 private sector  -17.7  -4.6  18.6  0.0  .  .
 Telecommunication
 (public sector)  8.3  6.0  -3.5  22.7  -39.2  -45.0
2.1). The analysed companies in the FBH also do not present strong liquidity and
short-term financial strength in this respect. In very many cases firms may have
trouble covering their short terms obligations due to a high level of short term
liabilities (this can be a reason for inter-enterprise charges or obligations for the state
– taxes or social security contributions) or limited access to finance their duties. The
worst hit sectors in this respect in 2005 were: services (current ratio 0.1), trade and
repairs (current ratio 0.2), and mining and quarrying (current ratio 0.7).
4.2. Enterprise Sector Performance at the Banja Luka Stock Exchange
The financial analysis of 266 firms (out of 644 listed at the Banja Luka Stock
Exchange) identified by branch is provided (see Figures 7-9, Table 14). Also, the financial
conditions of the whole group of enterprises listed on the BLSE, though not broken down
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 13: Return on assets and current ratio (in percent)
  ROA  Current Ratio
    2002  2003  2004  2005  2002  2003  2004  2005
 Enterprises in the FBH  2.7  2.6  3.1  2.8  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.9
 public sector  2.2  2.4  3.1  2.6  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9
 private sector  5.5  3.5  3.2  4.2  0.9  1.0  0.7  0.8
 Industry  1.6  3.1  4.1  3.3  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.8
 public sector  0.4  1.7  4.2  1.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8
 private sector  2.6  4.4  4.1  4.8  0.7  0.9  0.6  0.8
 Mining and quarrying  …  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.6  1.1  0.9  0.7
 public sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  …  0.3  0.3  0.3  …
 private sector  …  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.3  1.2  1.0  0.7
 Electricity, gas and water supply
 (public sector)  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8
 Manufacturing
 (private sector)  7.1  6.1  5.4  7.4  1.1  1.2  0.8  0.8
 Construction  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.3  1.5
 public sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.9  1.9  2.1
 private sector  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.2
 Trade and repair 
 (private sector)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.4  0.2
 Services  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.1
 public sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2
 private sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.1
 Transportation  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.1  3.5  3.4  2.5
 public sector  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  3.9  6.0  9.0  5.9
 private sector  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  0.7  0.5  0.5
 Telecommunication
 (public sector)  16.8  15.5  15.0  14.6  2.2  3.7  1.3  1.5
by branch, are provided in this part. Due to serious data availability limits, the period of
analysis is much shorter (2004 and 2005) than was in the case of the FBH enterprises’
sample and the financial data are also more incomplete. Given the various differences in
data reporting, analysed financial indicators (those which include EBIT) cannot be
compared between the two groups. There is also lack in employment and wage data in
the SR sample, which makes this analysis much weaker than the previous one. 
Despite these shortages, we could investigate some trends in enterprise sector
development in the SR. The BLSE enterprise sample has two important advantages
over the FBH one; firstly, it is much bigger, which give us greater representative ness
for the overall analysis, and secondly the analysed enterprises (listed on the stock
exchange) are benchmarks for other companies in the region to meet in terms of their
behaviour and financial results. To obtain common recommendations for branches
across the whole country, we decided to identify the BLSE firms by type of activity
using the same division by branches as was used in the FBH enterprises’ analysis. We
managed to identify 41% of the group (266 units), for which financial analysis by
branch is provided. The full specification of the company names and symbols used on
the stock exchange is included in Annex 5. The biggest groups in the sample are
services firms (86 units) and industry firms (69 units). The groups of transportation
(27 units), manufacturing (20), trade (19), construction (18) and electricity, gas and
water supply (19) are also numerous.
The average revenues of the sample from BLSE companies amounted to KM
8.3 million in 2005, six-fold lower than in the case of the FBH (the significant
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange dataset.
Figure 7: Firms by branch listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange
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difference comes from BH telecom). Total income before taxes accumulated a
negative value of minus KM 46.6 million in 2004 and doubled to minus KM 93.1
million in 2005. The total value of assets, fixed assts and current assets declined
in line with negative profits. Due to negative profits, rates of return (income
before taxes to revenues in percentages) remained negative and declined from -
2.2% in 2004 to -4.2% in 2005. Enterprises losses also influenced the negative
values of ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE (Return on Equity) indicators, which
also decreased, reflecting the analysed firms’ poor financing possibilities. Current
ratio levels were also very low, which suggested their very weak short-term
financial strength. The cost level indicator acceded 100%, which reflects costs
higher than revenues in the analysed companies (102% in 2004 and 104% in
2005). Increases in this indicator tend to be evidence of deep-seated ignorance of
cost growth control. Unfortunately, we do not know the reasons of these costs
increases; most likely it was due to bad corporate governance.
Average revenues of all companies listed on the BLSE amounted to KM 4.2
million in 2005, two-fold smaller than in the selected group of firms identified by
branch and 13-fold less than in the case of FBH firms. Selected financial indicators
for the whole group are also very poor and even worse than in the selected group. This
may suggest either much poorer financial condition of the whole enterprise sector in
the SR or much weaker coverage by statistics.
All sectors have a very poor financial stance, with the exception of electricity, gas
and water supply and telecommunications (one company – Telecom Srpske AD Banja
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of financial dataset.
Table 14: Financial indicators by branches of listed companies on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange
  Cost levelindicator
 Rate
of return  ROA  ROE
 Current
ratio
 Working
capital to
revenues ratio
  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005  2004  2005
 644 firms listed
on the Stock
Exchange
 105.8  107.7  -5.8  -0.1  -1.2  -1.9  -1.6  -2.6  1.0  0.9  -1.9  -7.1
 266 identified
firms  102.2  104.2  -2.2  -4.2  -0.6  -1.2  -0.6  -1.4  1.1  1.0  7.0  1.4
 O/w Industry  118.5  129.7  -18.5  -29.7  -4.6  -8.6  -5.6  -11.4  0.9  0.7  -12.0  -30.1
 Mining
and quarrying  106.1  145.5  -6.1
 -45.
5  -2.4
 -21.
4  -3.0  -28.7  0.7  0.7  -21.0  -22.2
 Electricity, gas
and water supply  99.6  95.9  0.4  4.1  0.1  0.7  0.1  0.8  1.7  2.4  32.3  36.0
 Manufacturing  122.0  115.4  -21.9  -15.3  -5.6  -4.2  -7.3  -6.5  0.5  0.3  -67.1  -101.8
 Construction  107.3  98.7  -7.3  1.3  -10.4  1.9  -10.9  1.9  1.1  1.2  5.6  8.8
 Trade and repair  104.1  103.4  -4.1  -3.4  -4.7  -3.5  -6.0  -5.2  0.8  0.4  -8.0  -23.2
 Services  104.9  115.3  -4.9  -15.3  -2.4  -7.6  -2.6  -9.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  -5.7
 Transportation  112.7  99.6  -12.7  0.4  -4.6  0.2  -5.2  0.2  1.0  1.1  -0.8  2.7
 Telecom  74.7  76.6  25.3  23.4  12.6  11.1  15.6  13.8  1.4  1.1  6.8  1.3
Luka). Construction and transportation firms noted an effectiveness improvement in
2005 in comparison to very bad results in 2004. Industry, mining, manufacturing,
trade and services firms noted a very bad financial stance in 2004 and 2005.
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange dataset
Figure 8: Financial indicators of enterprises listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange in 2004-
2005 (the sample of 266 firms identified by branch)
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Banja Luka Stock Exchange dataset
Figure 9: Financial indicators of enterprises listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange in 2004-
2005 (all 644 companies listed)
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4.3. Obstacles in Business Environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Business in poor countries usually face much larger regulatory burden than those
in developed countries, including administrative costs, bureaucratic procedures and
delays associated with them. Heavy business regulations and weak property rights
have damaging effects on SME and big enterprises, and especially private ones. With
burdensome regulations, high taxes few businesses bother to register all economic
activities preferring to operate in NOE. The significant size of NOE in BH (BH (see The
Issues of Measurement) might be the evidence of existence of obstacles in business
environment. Another confirmation of the very serious problems faced by the BH’s
companies was indicated by surveys conducted by EBRD and the World Bank in the
form of BEEPS surveys and Doing Business reports. In this part, comparisons of
crucial obstacles in business development in BH compared to the benchmark countries
(countries (see Benchmark Selection for Bosnia and Herzegovina) will be provided.
4.3.1. BEEPS Surveys
The BEEPS surveys by EBRD have been carried out in three rounds but in the
first round (in 1999) BH was not yet included. The BEEPS surveyed 200 BH’s firms
about their business environment and interactions with the state in 2002 and 2005.
The BEEPS can be thought of as a compilation of indicators about what firms are
saying about the ways the government policies, rules, and procedures are
implemented in practice. The most important obstacles to business expansion in BH
in 2002 and 2005 comparing to benchmark countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and
Poland) in 1999 were similar, but the level of their significance differentiated.
We separated two categories of obstacles to business development. One group
was composed of those obstacles, which were referred in benchmark countries in
1999 to be almost as strong as in BH in 2002 and 2005. These obstacles were:
financing firms’ activities45 (the biggest similarities to Slovakia and Lithuania in
1999), taxes (in 2002 in BH as strong as Lithuania, in 2005 as strong as in Slovakia
in 1999), street crime (stronger in Lithuania in 1999 than in BH in 2002 and 2005),
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45 Questions in the BEEPS 1999 round survey differed slightly from 2002 and 2005 rounds. Some questions in
the further rounds (of 2002 and 2005) were more detailed than it was in 1999 round. In order to asses the
development in business environment in all 3 rounds of the survey (only for the needs of this analysis) the
small adjustment in questions was necessary. The detailed questions from the further rounds were combined
to the bigger category question from the former round. For financing (1999 category) we analyzed cost of
financing and access to financing – more detailed categories from further rounds. For taxes we took tax
administration and tax rates, for infrastructure we took transportation, electricity and telecommunication,
and for policy instability we took macroeconomic instability and uncertainty about regulatory policies. Other
categories of obstacles (corruption, street crime, organized crime/mafia, anti-competitive practice, and
functioning of judiciary) remained unchanged in all BEEPS rounds, that we did not change them.
organized crime (in BH 2005 as strong as in Lithuania in 1999), anti-competitive
practice (most likely Lithuanian level).
The second group of obstacles to business expansion was composed of those with
a significantly bigger importance for BH in 2002 and 2005 than it was in the
benchmark countries in 1999. In 2002 and 2005, BH’s enterprises referred to face
more difficulties in business expansion in the area of infrastructure, corruption, policy
instability, and functioning of judiciary then the benchmark countries in 1999. 
The most annoying problem category of doing business was high level of policy
instability in BH. This category was reported to be more than twice as strong in BH in
2002 and 2005 as in Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, and almost 10 times higher than in
Slovakia in 1999. It is worth mentioning that for the high level of policy instability this
category was more responsible than uncertainty about regulatory policies component
or macroeconomic instability component (about 60% versus 50%, respectively).  
Corruption is another important element for the business environment which
negatively affects business expansion in BH. Over 45% of questioned enterprises
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Source: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment & Enterprise Performance Surveys 1999, 2002, 2005 (BEEPS)
Figure 10: Business obstacles in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia in 1999, entrepreneurs
respond (in percent) 
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indicated corruption as an important obstacle in doing business in 2005. In 2002,
there were even more entrepreneurs claiming this (58%). In the benchmark countries
the problem of corruption in 1999 was much less important (2-3 times smaller) than
in BH in 2002 and 200546.
Infrastructure (a combined indicator for transportation, electricity, and
telecommunications) also remained stronger obstacle in business expansion in BH in
2002 and 2005 as well as in the benchmark countries in 1999. And a very significant
improvement is required in this area to face any major improvement.
Elimination of the majority of those obstacles and improvement business
environment lies in hands of the government. The major policy challenge for the
authorities should be to ensure dynamic inter-enterprise competition and
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46 In a very recent (2005) analysis of public perception of the level of corruption, conducted by the Transparency
International (which derives this indicator from a range of existing surveys), BH was rated 93 of 163
countries. Other countries with the equal ranking as BH were Armenia, Argentina, Eritrea, Syria and
Tanzania. According to the study, this indicator has not changed in BH significantly since 2004.
Source: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment & Enterprise Performance Surveys 1999, 2002, 2005 (BEEPS)
Figure 11: Business in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia in 1999, entrepreneurs respond
(in percent)
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development friendly business environment. To achieve these goals, the government
needs to provide the proper incentives and market signals by reforming its own
actions especially in the indicated areas.
Looking at the process of reduction of business obstacles in the benchmark
countries (in the period of 2002-05), we can assume that BH government is able to
achieve significant improvements. Some of the obstacles to business development in
BH have already been reduced in the analysed period in the area of taxes, policy
instability, functioning of judiciary, corruption, and organized crime. More
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Source: EBRD-World Bank Business Environment & Enterprise Performance Surveys 2005 (BEEPS)
Figure 12: The main obstacles in business environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Poland, and Latvia in 2002 and 2005 
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improvements are still required in infrastructure, firm financing, and street crime,
where no progress was made since 2002.
4.3.2. Doing Business Ranking
Most of the indicators from Doing Business reports by the World Bank, in contrast
to BEEPS surveys are generated by asking not entrepreneurs, but lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals in each surveyed country about the details of the
laws, rules, and procedures that govern various aspects of business activities.
The Doing Business methodology presents hypothetical cases or situations that
are the same for each country. Doing Business ranking can be thought of as a
compilation of indicators about various government policies, rules, and procedures.
This part of analysis is based on the findings of the Doing Business in 2007 survey.
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Source: Doing Business 2006, World Bank.
Figure 13: Ranks in Doing Business in South Eastern European Economies and Western
Balkans in 2005 and 2006
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Separated by main categories, the performance of BH shows practically no
significant improvement comparing to the previous years with the exception of
employing workers category (+1 rank) and registering property category (+3 ranks).
The most significant drop in ratings (-13 ranks) was registered at paying taxes
category (that would party contradict findings of the BEEPS). However, tax reforms
in BH took place only after the report was prepared. The most important
improvements in BH were required in the following areas: starting a business, dealing
with licenses, and registering property.
4.3.3. Investment Reform Index 2006 (IRI)
IRI47 points out several sectors in which the most significant business barriers
exist. In this context, the following areas are among the problematic ones in BH:
regulatory reform, tax policy, human capital, investment promotion and facilitation. 
In the field of regulatory reforms, BH has the lowest ranking in the region, measured
by the four main sub-dimensions (regulatory reform strategy, performance of the
regulatory oversight body, regulatory impact analysis and transparency). According to
IRI, BH has not yet formalized its regulatory reform strategy and it has introduced only
a small number of programmes aimed at improving the quality of the regulatory
framework in the business sector. There are only two programmes ongoing in this sector,
both of them donor driven. The “regulatory guillotine” in Republika Srpska, funded by
FIAS and USAID originally until September 2006, regulates the issuing of business
licenses to enterprises. Another USAID funded project in this area, SPIRA – Streamlining
permits and inspection regimes activity, is engaged in reducing the administrative
barriers for the operations of SMEs. The only oversight body in this respect in BH is the
Task Force for the Reduction of Administration Barriers, with very limited powers.  This
is also the reason why the BH ranks as low on the index of the regulatory oversight body
performance, when compared to other countries in the region. 
In many countries tax policy is one of the most important elements for boosting
business activities through domestic investments and FDI inflow. According to the
IRI, even though if SEE countries are at different stages of development, the SEE
region has one of world lowest statutory corporate tax rates. The only exception is BH,
more specifically the FBH entity, where the corporate tax rate lies at 30%. In RS the
rate remains similar to the SEE average (10%). Two problems are evident here: high
tax rates in the FBIH, and fragmentation of the single market due to the differentiated
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47 The study was undertaken by the OECD Investment Compact Project Team. The Investment compact is a
regional programme designed to improve the investment environment and encourage private sector
development in South East Europe (SEE).
tax rates in the two entities. One encouraging sign is a planned introduction of one
unified 15% tax rate throughout the country.   
In the area of investment promotion and facilitation BH is still particularly weak.
On the overall score, BH ranks the lowest out of all examined countries in the region,
Moldova being the only country with similarly poor performance. Measured by the
quality of its Investment Promotion and Facilitation Strategy, together with
Macedonia, BH occupies the last position. The two remaining sub-dimensions that
have been assessed in the study, namely the performance of the Investment Promotion
Agency and the transparency of business environment, rank below the average.  
According to the Stability Pact estimates, 70% of the educational infrastructure in
BH was destroyed during the war. In Bosnia, there is no countrywide comprehensive
education policy. The education policy is the competence of the entities, and in the
FBH of the cantons. There are twelve effective education laws in FBiH, one in the RS
and one in Brcko District, yielding a complex and fragmented legislative framework
and no coherent education strategy. The fragmentation of the education policy among
the entities and ten cantons is exacerbated by poor coordination among these
numerous levels of government. The teaching curriculum is outdated, and there is no
strategic link between the government’s education policy and private sector needs.
The statistical information about the needs of the labour market is generally poor.
While no link exists between the education curricula and the labour market needs, the
vocational training is weak.
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1. Within Copenhagen criteria, the EU established a twofold set of economic conditions
to examine the economic readiness for membership of an applicant country. It
requires the candidate to have a functioning market economy with free and open
competition, price and trade liberalisation and a developed financial services sector
as well as the capacity to withstand the competition in the EU market, namely that
enterprises are obliged to develop their ability to cope with competitive pressures
and forces in the European Union’s internal market, as well as the whole economy
of the applicant country compared to the economies of EU members. 
2. The economic criteria are formulated to be a “moving target”. This perception tends
to generate frustration in the candidate states and further suspicions about the
EU’s commitment to enlargement in general. However, over a long accession
process amid rapidly changing conditions flexibility has considerable advantages.
Nevertheless, the application of conditionality is not transparent and consistent.
3. The Commission follows its methodology on the economic criteria in each Opinion
and Regular Report on candidate countries. Opinions contain the first assessment
of the candidate countries with respect to the criteria set by the European Council
in 1993 and methodology implied by the European Commission in Agenda 2000.
the annual Progress Reports focus on those areas where some improvements could
still be made and on the economic developments of the last twelve months, using
the previous year’s assessment as a base. The EC document that combines the
knowledge of Opinions and Regular Reports is the Avis, which examines all
Copenhagen criteria in detail and looked at developments over several years in
order to assess readiness for accession.
4. Comparison of past and present economic indicators of BH with new Member
States of the EU that joined in 2004 (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia) and with the group of countries
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5. Conclusions and policy
recommendations
with formal candidate status in 2006 (Turkey, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia as well as two acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania), as well as
other economies in the South Eastern Europe region set the proper benchmark for
the analysis of economic policy. 
5. Judging by current GDP per capita levels and changes in these levels over the past
decade, BH today is at a stage comparable to those of the five current candidate and
accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Turkey) roughly a decade ago. On the other hand, NMS8 had a visibly
higher average GDP per capita back in 1996 (in fact, even in 1993) than BH in 2005-
2006. Among this group of countries only 1997-1998 Latvian GDP per capita was
comparable to the 2005-2006 BH level. However, the gap to Bulgaria and Romania
(joining the EU in January 2007) is visibly smaller – BH’s 2005-2006 GDP per capita
level is comparable to Bulgaria and Romania in 2000-2001. BH’s development level
(GDP per capita as proxy) is comparable to other Balkan countries that have not yet
started negotiations on EU accession (Albania and Serbia). 
6. National accounts data for BH are not adjusted for the non-observed economy
(NOE). A number of studies have estimated the NOE for BH from over 57% to
30% of officially estimated GDP during 2001-2003. Therefore, ratios to GDP –
important comparative and informative indicators for any economy, may appear
less accurate for BH than for other countries, especially from the EU. In 2005-
2006, BH presented a similar level of GDP per capita PPP as Lithuania and
Latvia in 1996-1997 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2000-2001, which in both
cases was 7 years before accession to the EU, respectively in 2004 and in 2007.
A “conservative” 30-% adjustment for the NOE would obviously improve the
benchmark level for BH and situate the country at the level of new Member
States 2-3 years before EU accession.
7. The GDP per capita is not the only comparative and informative indicator for an
economy. Taking into account the he human development index BH in 2004
presented a similar level of human development as Lithuania and Latvia in 1999,
which was 5 years before these two countries joined the EU. However, during
1999-2004, just before the EU accession Lithuania and Latvia (together with
Estonia) achieved a very substantial progress in development that resulted from a
broadening and deepening of economic reforms. The Baltic countries were the
first countries from NMS8 that finalised accession negotiations with the EU.
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8. The analysis conducted by the Commission in the Opinions led to the following
overall picture common to all countries (Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia)
chosen for comparative reasons for BH: 
• Trade integration and FDI have progressed substantially (except for Romania
and BH). However, in Romania, there has been a reversal from initial trade
liberalisation, mainly for macroeconomic reasons; 
• The functioning of capital markets and competition rules has been improving
everywhere, but is generally still far from satisfactory; 
• The state of infrastructure remained poor (except for Croatia); 
• Wage levels were still well below EU levels; 
• Privatisation has progressed at different rates and the process remains to be
completed. 
• Most applicants needed or still need to restructure large state-owned
industries, which dominate local economies and tend to be very hard to
reform for both social and economic reasons.
9. Although BH does not yet have a formal candidate country status and therefore no
Opinion has been developed by the Commission, it is assessed according to the
Copenhagen criteria within Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) starting
from the 2005 Progress Report. According to the Commission in 2005 the BH
economy operated only to a limited degree within the framework of functioning
market principles. Further reform efforts were called for as necessary to address
the serious shortcomings in the competitiveness of the economy. To maintain
macroeconomic stability and safeguard the sustainability of the currency board, a
prudent macroeconomic policy mix is a priority. In order to strengthen the
productive base of the economy, the largely loss-making corporate sector must be
urgently and fundamentally restructured and privatisation accelerated. In
addition, actions to reduce overall government interference in the economy and
improve the business climate are essential. The flexibility of the labour market
should be enhanced and the judicial system, in particular the handling of
bankruptcies and property rights, strengthened. To successfully manage the fiscal
challenges, coordination and analytical capabilities need to be improved and the
size of public expenditures be reduced in real terms. These demanding tasks
require firm political commitment and cooperation between different levels of
government. In general, the functioning of market forces is hampered by the
strong influence of the public sector in the economy and the weak business
environment and legal climate. Despite some improvements, markets are also
sometimes fragmented between entities.
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10. BH arguably had some of the most difficult starting conditions for economic, political
and social transformation among the countries emerging from the dissolution of the
former socialist block. Violent military conflict of early 1990s brought large losses of
human life, destruction of a physical infrastructure and institutions, and led to an
extremely difficult and tense political environment and social relations in which the
subsequent state building and political, social and economic reforms needed to take
place. This perspective is important for understanding developments leading to
eventual fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and integration with the EU.
11. Dayton agreement (1995) brought an end to the war period establishing the present
political divisions and structure of government and allowed the international
community to get more seriously involved in supporting BH. In late 1990s, the
country recorded a period of strong post-conflict recovery. During 1996-1999,
reconstruction activity buoyed economic growth, which averaged above 30 percent
per annum. Over the period 2000-2006 BH recorded average annual growth rates
of around 6.6% per annum, while for the three comparative groups this oscillated
between 6.2% and 7.3%. This indicates that while BH has been recently catching
up with the more developed EU countries (for example the EU15 group), there was
hardly any convergence, even a divergence, with other European economies –
NMS8 and the Balkan accession and candidate countries. It signals a very long and
relatively slow catch up process for BH. Overall, 10 years after Dayton the GDP
roughly tripled in size, though was still below the pre-war levels. 
12. Given its very low development level, its human capital and other characteristics
and the experience of other transition economies it would appear that BH might
be able to boost its potential economic growth to higher levels. The key to
improving development potential lies in domestic reforms. 
13. Labour market is one sector where several shortcomings of BH economy are
visible. The three key challenges in this field are low productivity and relatively
high wages in the formal sector of the economy, large (and according to some
sources growing) informal employment and high unemployment. This list could be
extended by adding the low overall employment rate (taking the formal and
informal sectors together) and possibly also the problem of the (in)adequate labour
market-related skills of recent graduates and in the population at large.
14. Another set of problems demonstrates itself in foreign trade performance. Up till
2003 trends were quite discouraging with foreign aid flows driving demand for
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imports and very weak export performance. Since 2003 export dynamics improved
considerably and this trend is likely to continue. One general conclusion emerging
from analysis of BH foreign trade is that impediments to its development are
primarily of a domestic nature, rather than related to foreign trade policies. In
other words, poor export performance can be linked to a sub-par investment
climate, difficult conditions for doing business, a rigid labour market, high taxation
on registered economic activity (and a large unregistered economy), limited
know-how and outdated technology in BH companies. Such a view can also be
supported by the experience of the EU new Member States over the last decade.
15. In the case of BH specifically it seems that the Commission puts pressure on
macroeconomic stability and broad consensus about economic policy as key
elements to enhance the performance of a market economy. Maintaining a
sustainable macroeconomic stability is a necessary precondition on the road to EU
accession. The currency board arrangement in BH has allowed for inflation
stabilisation. It has also strongly reduced the real effective exchange volatility in the
past and is likely to play such a role in the future – possibly until adoption of the Euro
at some stage. This is not synonymous with stating that the currency board does not
cause any problems for the BH economy. No single exchange rate and monetary
regime is free from drawbacks. The point is rather that for a small, open, European
economy trading mostly with Euro-zone countries or countries with stable
currencies against the Euro, maintaining a peg is the best option. The experiences of
the Baltic countries, which have opted for a similar exchange rate arrangement since
early 1990s, and the experience of Bulgaria - which switched to a currency board
after a major crisis in 1996-1997 - is quite encouraging in this respect.
16. The experience of the NMS also highlights the role of the fiscal position, which is
particularly important in smaller countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. Of
key concern is not only keeping the fiscal position close to balance in the medium
term, but the size and structure of fiscal expenditures. 
17. Much of the internal political debate in BH has concentrated on the trade balance
“problem”, with the implicit or explicit policy objective of reducing the trade
deficit. Such a view should be considered as somewhat simplistic. In particular,
BH exports are very dependent on imported inputs and a high level of processing
takes place in BH before re-export to the EU and other regions. This is not a
negative phenomenon and given the small size of he country, increasing openness
(both for imports and exports) is a natural trend. What is of importance is that BH
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enterprises successfully compete with European and global players. Only
improved competitiveness can help spur exports and induce consumers to choose
domestically produced rather than imported goods.
18. BH’s macroeconomic prospects for the next 5-10 years strongly depend on
domestic reforms, which would determine the pace of development and catch-up
with the EU. The three scenarios can be drawn. 
19. The optimistic scenario (the “Baltic scenario”) assumes a coherent set of economic
policies maintaining macroeconomic stability (in particular improving
medium-term fiscal prospects), reducing the tax and regulatory burden on the
economy, thus allowing for a reduction in the scale of unregistered economic
activity. Easing of conditions for doing business, coupled with productivity gains
and real wage restraints, could provide a major boost to the external
competitiveness of BH production and a surge in exports. This would be supported
by rising FDI inflows further encouraged by the prospects of eventual EU
accession. The Baltic countries experienced very fast convergence in GDP per
capita levels, as they needed around seven years to close the gap between their
position and the EU25 average by 10 percentage points. Therefore, in the
optimistic scenario BH could reach a GDP per capital level in PPS equal to around
35% of the EU25 average before 2017, no more than a decade from now.
20. The second scenario (the “Bulgaria-Poland scenario”) forecasts BH to reach
around 35% of the EU25’s GDP per capita by 2021, 15 years from now following
path of stop-and-go reforms of Poland and Bulgaria. 
21. The third scenario can be based on the recent experience of another ex-Yugoslavia
country that recently acquired EU candidate status – Macedonia. The modest
growth rates that have been registered in this country since 2003 imply that that
its GDP per capita in PPS is expected to increase from just above 24% of the EU25
average in 2003 to 27% in 2008. Assuming a similar pace of convergence for BH
(the “Macedonian scenario”) implies that by 2025 BH would not even reach a level
of 30% of average EU25 GDP per capita. 
22. Meeting the economic criteria requires, certainly in the case of transition economies,
deep and lasting structural reforms that take time to be accomplished. The issue of
track record, which was one of the factors considered by the Commission, becomes
then highly relevant. In this context, track record means the irreversible, sustained
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and verifiable implementation of reforms and policies over a period long enough to
allow for a permanent change in the expectations and behaviour of economic agents
and the assessment that the achievements will be lasting.
23. Privatisation process is one of the most important institutional and structural
features of every transition economy and especially relevant from the perspective
of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Before 1991, before the ownership transition
was initiated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the number of entities owned by the state or
with state shareholding stood at 2,508 companies and 40 banks. Privatisation has
been carried in parallel in both the FBH and the RS using somewhat different
methods. Both privatisation processes have been conducted on three levels:
small-scale privatisation, privatisation of large state-owned companies and
strategic companies. BH has kept in its possession a large portfolio of state-owned
companies and the privatisation of strategic firms has continued to be slow.
24. If one takes 2004 as a base year (six years after official start of privatisation), the
following results were achieved: the total value of privatised companies stands at 50%
of total registered companies slated for privatisation. In the RS, KM 4.5 billion worth,
or 53% of earmarked companies, were privatised. In the FBH the results were even
poorer, with privatisation bringing in KM 5.3 billion, 39% of the planned level.
25. Small-scale privatisation was completed within only a few years. Public share
offerings for privatisation of state-owned companies were concluded on November
5, 2002. Some of larger companies, both state-owned and syndicated, requested
special status, i.e. that of a strategic company. The major difference in approach
to the privatisation of strategic and other companies was in the criteria that were
applied. In the privatisation of a strategic company, the financial offer is not
usually ranked as the most important factor in evaluation of offers. Instead, the
agency tends to assess the sustainability of the business, including the seriousness
of the partner and his market position.
26. Before 2004, the FBH laid out a list of 56 strategic companies and by the end of
2004 had privatised 28, or 50%, of them. The RS, likewise, set out a list of 52
strategic companies for privatisation and by the end of 2004 had privatised 43, or
82%, of them. Experience has shown that a number of companies of strategic
importance for the government have been the subject of change, and this will
increase with time. During 2005-06, progress was made in privatisation and
corporate restructuring in the RS, mostly because of the new government, which
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has been dedicated to the implementing further economic transition. Important
laws have been adopted by the RS parliament, including a Securities Law and
Investment Fund Law.
27. BH attracted FDI of EUR 250 million in the first nine months of 2006 and FDI is
expected to reach EUR 400 million by the end of the year, up from EUR 330
million in 2005. Aggregate FDI stock per capita should reach EUR 495 in 2006,
58% went to industry and 16% to the banking sector. FDI is likely to rise to some
EUR 1.0 billion in 2007 as stalled privatisations are expected to be restarted after
the election of November 2006 and the formation of a new government. This level
still could be regarded as unsatisfactory, particularly because of the inadequate
level of greenfield investments and slow privatisation process.
28. In 2005, private sector activity reached 55% of GDP from around 50% in 2004.
The privatisation process continues to reshape the overall structure of the
economy. However, one of the problematic issues for the government is the
opening of criminal charges against a previous government that had privatised one
of the state owned banks. Reopening previous privatisations if considered a
friction fight in politics might tarnish BH’s image abroad and impact on investors”
risk calculations for further BH investments.
29. In 2006, the privatisation process was continued irrespective of the political
debates during the political campaign. In the RS, the Privatisation Directorate has
finalised the privatisation of 38 larger companies. 40% of state owned nominal
capital intended for privatisation remains to be privatised, mostly in the utilities and
infrastructure sectors (strategic companies). In the FBH, the results have been less
favourable, with only 13 companies sold. However, approximately 40% of nominal
capital for privatisation remains in the state’s hands – a level similar to the RS.
30. Microeconomic analysis of the BH companies concentrates on identification of the
comparative advantages, assess productivity, and to position the BH enterprise
sector towards the potential competition on the EU markets. The financial analysis
of enterprises is detached on the data of 45 enterprises in the FBH and 266 firms
listed at the Banja Luka Stock Exchange (BLSE) identified by branches. Due to
serious data availability limits, the period of analysis for companies listed at BLSE
is much shorter (2004 and 2005) than was in the case of the FBH enterprises’
sample covering the period of 2002-05. Given the various differences in data
reporting, analysed financial indicators for both sets of companies could only be
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compared with some caution. Generally speaking, the microeconomic data for BH
face similar problems as national accounts data, which undermines the quality of
any statistical or financial analysis.
31. The sample of analysed enterprises in the FBH is quite effective in terms of earnings
before taxation (EBIT) and not very effective in terms of net income. Only 40% of
firms indicated a positive net income in 2005 (20% in the public sector and 45% in
the private sector), less than in 2002. All manufacturing firms obtained positive net
income in the whole period under analysis. There were also very impressive shares
for strong performing firms in construction. A much smaller number of profitable
firms was observed in industry (35.5%), trade (40% - the sample average) and
services (only 20%). In mining and quarrying, electricity and water supply and
transportation, as well as public construction and public services, there was not one
profitable firm observed in 2005. Looking at the rate of return of the group (EBIT to
revenues ratio), firms’ performances appear to be much better, however. The
average rate of return was set at a very impressive level of 11% in 2002 and 9.6% in
2005. In the last three years, the public sector has been more effective than the
private one in terms of this indicator (an annual average of 10%). The most effective
was BH Telecom, which as a monopoly affected the results of the whole sample.
When we exclude it from the analysis, the average rate of return for the public sector
is only 0.5% in 2005, much lower than in the private sector (7.9% in 2005).
32. The analysed firms in the FBH reported a very strict policy of cost control. The
cost level indicator (the ratio of total costs to total revenues in percent) was very
low and declining in the period under analysis. Private sector firms were more
effective in terms of reducing the cost level indicator than public ones (from 85.6%
in 2002 to 79.5% in 2005 in the private sector and for public sector 84.5% in 2002
to 85.4% in 2005). The biggest reduction in the cost level indicator was observed
in private manufacturing, by 15 percentage points. Firms in the FBH also reported
a very low share of wages in total costs. This was approximately 11% in the public
sector (annual average) and 10% in the private sector. This small share of labour
costs indicates that costs other than wages were more important in the production
process and in services in the FBH economy as a whole.
33. The average monthly wage was increasing in FBH firms in nominal terms
throughout the whole period under analysis, from KM 698 (EUR 358) in 2002 to KM
816 (EUR 418) in 2005. The nominal wage increase amounted to 17%. The nominal
wage increase was supported by impressive labour productivity growth (total
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revenues to employment ratio). The total productivity level grew by 27% (a bigger
increase than the nominal wage increase of 14%). Labour productivity was higher in
the public sector thanks to a significantly higher level of labour productivity in public
industry and high productivity in BH Telecom. The labour productivity growth
observed in public industry amounted to 57%. In private manufacturing,
productivity grew by almost 8%, in line with impressive employment increases (year
on year growth amounted to 35% in 2005). Wages in manufacturing decreased in
nominal terms (by 2.6%), which may suggest that manufacturing entrepreneurs kept
their wages more or less stable. Entrepreneurs probably allocate profits for the
purpose of investment rather than current wage increases. This approach is highly
required in transition economies in the early process of building a market economy.
This was confirmed by very strong investment outlay growth and impressive
employment growth in manufacturing in 2005. The return of this investment may
strongly improve manufacturing and wage increases in the future.
34. A positive return on assets in the sample (the ratio of EBIT to total assets in
percent) is to a large extent supported by the fact that companies did not report
their losses, giving zero instead of negative EBIT values. However, the objective of
the ROA analysis, as well as analysis of efficiency, was observation of trends in the
particular sectors. Only in the indicated sectors (industry, manufacturing, BH
Telecom and private construction) were assets utilised effectively. Our sample does
not indicate a strong current ratio (bigger than 2) in any of the analysed sections,
with the exception of public transportation (a very high level of current assets in
this sector in comparison to a low level of current liabilities is the result of this type
of economic activity) and public construction in 2005 (current ratio 2.1). The
analysed companies in the FBH also do not present strong liquidity and short-term
financial strength in this respect. In very many cases firms may have trouble
covering their short terms obligations due to a high level of short term liabilities
(this can be a reason for inter-enterprise charges or obligations for the state – taxes
or social security contributions) or limited access to finance their duties. The worst
hit sectors in this respect in 2005 were: services (current ratio 0.1), trade and
repairs (current ratio 0.2), and mining and quarrying (current ratio 0.7).
35. Total income before taxes in the sample of BLSE companies accumulated a
negative value of minus KM 46.6 million in 2004 and doubled to minus KM 93.1
million in 2005. The total value of assets, fixed assts and current assets declined in
line with negative profits. Due to negative profits, rates of return (income before
taxes to revenues in percentages) remained negative and declined from -2.2% in
2002 to -4.2% in 2005. Enterprises losses also influenced the negative values of ROA
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and ROE indicators, which also decreased, reflecting the analysed firms’ poor
financing possibilities. Current ratio levels were also very low, which suggested
their very weak short-term financial strength. The cost level indicator acceded
100%, which reflects costs higher than revenues in the analysed companies (102%
in 2004 and 104% in 2005). Increases in this indicator tend to be evidence of
deep-seated ignorance of cost growth control. Unfortunately, we do not know the
reasons of these costs increases; most likely it was due to bad corporate governance.
36. All sectors represented by the sample of BLSE companies have a very poor
financial stance, with the exception of electricity, gas and water supply and
telecommunications (one company – Telecom Srpske AD Banja Luka).
Construction and transportation firms noted an effectiveness improvement in 2005
in comparison to very bad results in 2004. Industry, mining, manufacturing, trade
and services firms noted a very bad financial stance in 2004 and 2005.
37. Business in poor countries usually face much larger regulatory burden than those in
developed countries, including administrative costs, bureaucratic procedures and
delays associated with them. Heavy business regulations and weak property rights
have damaging effects on SME and big enterprises, and especially private ones. 
38. The BEEPS surveys by EBRD identified that the most important obstacles in
business expansion in BH in 2002 and 2005 and benchmark countries (Lithuania,
Latvia, Slovakia and Poland) in 1999 were similar, but the level of their
significance differentiated. We separated two categories of. One group was
composed of those obstacles, which were referred in benchmark countries in 1999
to be almost as strong as in BH in 2002 and 2005. The same obstacles in business
development in BH as in the benchmark countries were: financing firms’
activities, taxes, street and organized crime, and anti-competitive practice.
Significantly bigger importance for BH than for the benchmark countries were in
the area of infrastructure, corruption, policy instability, and functioning of
judiciary. However, the most annoying problem category of doing business was
high level of policy instability in BH compared to the benchmark countries.
39. The indicators from Doing Business reports by the World Bank shows practically
no significant improvement in BH comparing to the previous years with the
exception of employing workers category and registering property category. The
most significant drop in ratings was registered at paying taxes category (that
would party contradict findings of the BEEPS). However, tax reforms in BH took
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place only after the report was prepared. The most important improvements in BH
were required in the following areas: starting a business, dealing with licenses, and
registering property.
40. Elimination of the majority of business obstacles lies in hands of the BH
government. The major policy challenge for the authorities should be to ensure
dynamic inter-enterprise competition and development friendly business
environment. To achieve these goals, the government needs to provide the proper
incentives and market signals by reforming its own actions especially in the
indicated areas. Looking at the process of reduction of business obstacles in the
benchmark countries, we can expect that BH government is able to achieve
significant improvements. Some of the obstacles to business development in BH
have already been reduced in the analysed period in the area of taxes, policy
instability, functioning of judiciary, corruption, and organized crime/mafia. More
improvements are still required in infrastructure, firm financing and street crime,
were no progress was made since 2002.
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Telecom Privatisation
BH has three telecom companies originally formed to cover ethnically divided
territories, but later legally obliged to cover the whole country. The biggest
Sarajevo-based telecom firm is BH Telekom; followed by Banja Luka-based Telekom
Srpske and smallest is HT Mostar. All three companies have wireless units.
RS’s main telecom company Telekom Srpske48 saw gross profits rise in the first
half of 2006 by 23% year-on-year to KM 41.25 million (EUR 21.08 million), on
revenues of KM 169.66 million. The RS government published a tender for
privatisation of 65% of the state’s shares in Telekom Srpske in August 2006. The
government decided that the starting price could not be lower than EUR 400 million.
Deutsche Telekom's Hungarian unit Magyar Telekom, Telekom Austria, France
Telecom, Norway's Telenor, Iceland's Novator, Russia's Sistema Telecom and Serbia's
fixed-line monopoly Telekom Srbija bought tender documents, while Egypt's Orascom
Telecom, Cyprus's PlanetSky, Switzerland's Valiva AG and Finland's Elisa
Corporation submitted requests to obtain tender documents. The deadline for placing
bids was November 20, 2006. According to the latest available data two companies
have submitted bid documentations: Telecom Austria and Telekom Srbija. Telenor
decided to pull out just before offer submission deadline49.
Bearing in mind that Telekom Srpske is a strategic company, the government
established special conditions for potential bidders, namely that they had at least
800,000 fixed-line and 1.5 million mobile phone subscribers and total revenues of no
less than EUR 500 million in 2005. The guarantee to be paid by bidders was set at
EUR 1.5 million. It is expected that the privatisation of Telekom Srpske will bring in
receipts of 2% of GDP in 2006 and 2007.
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48 For more see: www.telekomsrpske.com
49 Researcher’s interview with representative of the RS government.
Annex 1: Privatisation Process
of Strategic Sectors
The RS government’s decision to sell off Telecom Srpske effectively pushed the
FBH government to go ahead with privatisation of BH Telekom and HT Mostar, due
to justified fears that if one strong international company bought the main RS telecom
company and then entered the BH market, the total value of the other two telecom
providers’ assets could fall significantly. The FBH parliament, however, voted to
reject the proposal, saying it was too early to sell and requested the government
prepare a privatisation strategy for the companies. The outcome of elections held in
November will without doubt produce a change in government structure, and
therefore such a strategy may have to wait a little longer before it sees the light of day. 
Energy Sector Privatisation
BH has three state-owned power companies licensed to produce, distribute and
sell electricity. The biggest utility, Elektroprivreda BH, and the smallest,
Elektroprivreda HZ HB, are based in the FBH, while the mid-sized company
Elektroprivreda RS is located in the RS.
The RS government has adopted an action plan for the restructuring and
privatisation of the RS power sector that resulted in speeding up several key projects
for the construction of coal-fired and hydropower plants using budgetary sources or
via public-private partnership.
The RS government is the owner of majority stakes in the oil sector in BH: 65%
of the Brod refinery50. 62.3% of the Modrica refinery51, and 65% of fuel retailer
Petrol52. In August 2006, the RS government agreed to sell its majority stakes in Brod,
Modrica and Petrol to the state-owned Russian oil company Zarubezhneft for a total
of EUR 979 million in cash and investments. Brod has outstanding debts and the
government has opened talks with its major creditors in a bid to settle the issue. This
is the key issue holding up realisation of the project. Brod’s outstanding debt amounts
to EUR 190 million. Another offer has been received from the Austrian company,
Elvad Energy Vienna, which offered EUR 300 million for state-owned capital and
EUR 190 million to cover the debts. The government is assessing both offers in
accordance with legally prescribed procedures, although according to the preliminary
due diligence conducted together with the Vienna Business Court it seems the latter
of the two foreign companies will be unable to meet the requested goals.
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50 Brod is the only fuel-producing oil refinery in BH.
51 Modrica is a small refinery producing motor and industrial oils, lubricants and paraffin.
52 Petrol was previously called Energopetrol and was part of the socialist conglomerate Energoinvest. During
Energoinvest’s privatization it was decided that Energopetrol would be excluded from total Energoinvest
assets because of its strategic importance.
In July 2006, the London-based Energy Financing Team (EFT Group) announced
construction of a EUR 250 million coal-fired power plant near its lignite mine at
Stanari (in the north-west of the RS) by 2010. The EFT Group has controlled the
Stanari mine since 2005, holding 76%-24% (more precisely, in a stake of 76.11%,
23.89% is a joint venture with the mine). The EFT Group has pledged to secure EUR
14.1 million in equity capital for 76.11% of the joint venture and spend a total of EUR
14 million to cover the mine's existing debts and improve technical solutions in the
production process.
In addition to this, Czech power utility CEZ is ready to invest EUR 1.4 billion in
reconstruction of the Gacko thermal power plant. All these investment will result in
changes in ownership structures.
The Slovenian state-owned power conglomerate Holding Slovenske Elektrarne
(HSE)53 in July 2006 concluded an agreement with the RS power utility
(Elektroprivreda RS) to co-operate in the construction of power generation facilities
estimated to be worth between EUR 600 and 700 million. The agreement covers the
construction of a new 600 megawatt block in the Ugljevik thermal power plant and
upgrading of the old thermal power plant at Ugljevik, as well as the construction of
hydropower plants and technical co-operation. HSE has announced plans to double
generation capacity in the medium term, mainly by expanding in the Balkans. In July
2006, the RS government announced that it would not seek to privatise its power utility
Elektroprivreda RS, but instead aim to develop it as a company of regional importance. 
The RS government plan is to restructure Elektroprivreda RS into a 100%
state-owned holding company, which would hold 65% stakes in its sub-units: both the
distribution companies and power plants. The decision was made aimed at concentrating
capacities and resources before a shift towards larger investments54. The government is
undertaking action to move forward with the construction of the Krupa and Krupa Niska
hydropower plants on the Vrbas River near Banja Luka and will seek a private investor
with whom to start building the Buk Bijela hydropower plant near Foca under a
public-private partnership scheme. Both projects have been heavily criticised by NGOs
and tourism and environmentally oriented independent organisations55.
As explained previously, the two largest civil engineering companies majority
owned by the FBH state are in the process of being sold: Energoinvest and
Hidrogradnja. Moreover, in October 2006, the Croatian-Hungarian Consortium
INA-MOL56 bought 67% state-owned stakes in the biggest FBH state-owned fuel
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53 HSE is the largest electricity producer in Slovenia and it unites the hydro power plants located on the Drava,
Sava and Soca rivers, the Velenje coal mine and the Brestanica and Sostanj coal-fired power plants.
54 Researcher’s interview with a sector-expert.
55 Researcher’s interview with scouts from Banjaluka and Greenvisions Sarajevo.
56 MOL Group owns 25% of INA.
retailer Energopetrol57. Energopetrol has network of 65 fuel retail stations. The FBH
government kept 22% of the company and small shareholders hold 11%. This
agreement was the biggest privatization deal in 2006. INA-MOL will pay EUR 5.2
million, EUR 30 million to cover debts and invest an additional EUR 75 million in
Energopetrol’s aim of creating a modern, competitive and more client-oriented
company. It is important to recall here that this privatisation deal has been passed to
the FBH parliament many times before, over several years, and thrown out for
politically motivated reasons. 
The FBH government chose the Austrian government consortium APET (Varech,
Port, Poyry, Alstom, Siemens, Voith, Alpine and Wew) as a partner to build four
hydro-electric power plants: in Ustikolina, Vranduk, Rmanj, and Vrilo. The framework
agreement additionally includes building of four thermo-power plants and reconstruction
of two mines. The total value of investment should be around EUR 2.5 billion.
Financial Sector Development – Privatisation of Banks and Investment
Funds
One of the major characteristics of the BH economy is the successfully completed
process of banking sector privatisation and the transformation of Privatisation
Investment Funds (PIFs) into investment funds. As a result, the banking sector is one
of the most successful in the region and confidence in investment funds is growing in
line with growing share prices on the stock markets in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. 
Ownership structure in the banking sector is showing a downsizing trend in terms
of governmental shares. At a beginning of 2001, 43% of the banking sector in the FBH
was state-owned and around 60% in the RS. During 2002-2004, the majority of stakes
in the banking sector were sold to foreign banks. In 2004, the FBH government was
the owner of 18% of banks’ shares, with foreign ownership at 65%. At the beginning
of the privatisation process, the RS was slightly behind the FBH, but in 2004 its
privatisation was almost completed, with 76% of shares becoming foreign owned, and
the state holding only 1.5% of banks’ shares. It is expected that foreign ownership will
increase further to 75% of total capital in BH in 2006.
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57 Energopetrol is the same case as Petrol in the RS. Before the war, Energopetrol and Petrol were parts of one
company, but during the war its mother company Energoinvest was divided into two parts, based on territory
(the RS and FBH parts). After the collapse of Energoinvest, the only profitable part remained fuel retailer
Petrol/Energopetrol, so both governments excluded it from Energoinvests” total assets and created an
independent business entity.
After the privatisation, the number of banks increased only from 3358 to 34 (two
banks were merged and two new banks were registered). Privatisation increased
concentration in the banking sector, with four dominant groups:
• Raiffeisen bank BH (privatised Market Bank), 
• Hypo Alpe Adria Group (controlling two banks – one in RS/Banja Luka and
one in FBH/Mostar)
• Unicredit Zagreb Bank BH, and 
• Nova Ljubljanska bank (which controlled CBS bank Sarajevo, LHB bank
Banja Luka, Development Bank Banja Luka and Tuzla bank Tuzla.)
The total assets of the four major banks at the beginning of 2006 amounted to KM
6.4 billion, which was 70% of overall market share, 72% of total deposits and 70% of
total loans in the banking sector in BH.
Privatisation Investment Funds and insiders (previous management and
employees), have become the largest ownership groups in a significant number of
companies. The main characteristic of this process is the absence of strong and
effective owners with capital, which is essential for enterprise restructuring and
development. Essentially, privatization via PIF tends to contribute to a weakness of
the corporate governance framework. There are more than 1,000 enterprises under
PIF ownership and combined they represent the core of the real economy. Of 475
companies in the FBH and 551 in the RS, only in a small number of companies do
individual PIFs hold a controlling stake package59. PIFs are comparatively small and
their technical capacity is 3 to 4 investment specialists and from 50 to 100 companies
in their portfolios. PIFs are not able to act as active owners to force changes in their
portfolio companies60. PIFs are expected to convert themselves into Investment
Funds, but the procedures for this conversion have not been prepared by the securities
commissions and there is a lack of interest among PIFs due to several limitations, e.g.
a 10% limit on share holding in a single company. Another solution for PIFs would be
to register as joint stock companies. However, together with insiders, PIFs hold
majority packages in more than 2,000 companies.
During 2006, key supporting factors for the development of the capital market in
BH are the stability of the local currency, low inflation, the strong banking sector,
existing capital market institutions, networking with regional bourses and planned
issues of corporate bonds by commercial banks. The combined turnover of the two
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58 24 banks in FBH; nine banks in the RS.
59 PIFs are expected to reduce their ownership to the maximum level allowed by law (30% in the FBH and 20%
in the RS).
60 Researcher’s interview with representatives of transportation company Vihor, Bratunac, in which PIF
Jahorina is the main shareholder.
stock exchanges is EUR 148.8 million. The Sarajevo Stock Exchange’s (SSE) share
was 65% of turnover and the Stock Exchange Index of the Republika Srpska (BIRS)
only 35%. On the SSE privatisation fund index, the Bosnian Investment Fund Index
increased 151% during 2005. The major reason for this was inflows of foreign funds,
mostly from Slovenia. The Stock Exchange Index of the Republika Srpska rose 15%
between May 1, 2004, when it was launched, and the end of 2005. In total, both stock
exchanges increased their market capitalisation by approximately 70% in 2005.
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Energoinvest is the biggest engineering group and the fifth largest BH exporter61
(in 2005, Energoinvest reported revenues of KM 267.9 million and a net profit of KM
7.743 million, up from a KM 4.325 million in 2004). Although it was originally
planned for a May 2006 bid (see Annex 3) it was eventually started only in October
2006, when FBH’s Agency for Privatization invited international bids for a 67% stake
in Energoinvest. 33% of the company’s shares is controlled by private shareholders
and investment funds. The agency decided not to set a minimum price, although the
government valued its stake at KM 147.9 million (EUR 75.5 million). Energoinvest is
a strategic company and therefore the agency set the following conditions buyers must
fulfil: maintaining the core activity of the company and retaining its 733 employees
for at least three years after the purchase. 
The Privatization Agency, in cooperation with government, decides on the
priorities for the development of the strategic company and in accordance with these
priorities defines the bids’ evaluation criteria. These do not necessary differ, but they
should be decided independently in accordance to the development plan. In this case,
the table below provides an explanation of the evaluation criteria used in more details. 
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61 Exporting to the United States, Mexico, Malaysia, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Algeria, Turkey,
Slovenia and Croatia.
Annex 2: The Implementation
of Privatisation Plans – Cases
of Energoinvest and Hidrogradnja 
Evaluation criteria for the bids in the privatisation of strategic company Energoinvest:
Criteria Weight in bid evaluation
Offered price 50%
Planned investments 10%
Employment plans 10%
Proposed business plan 20%
Experience and the qualities of the candidate 10%
Immediately after publishing the bid for the privatisation of Energoinvest, a bid
for the privatization of 67% stake in construction company Hidrogradnja was
announced, with a three month delay from the original plan. 
Hidrogradnja is one of the biggest construction companies in BH, active in the
construction of roads, tunnels bridges, railways, dams, water supply and sewage
systems62. Even though the company has developed the scope of its activities, its profits
are downsizing, from KM 304,000 in 2004 to KM 161,000 (EUR 82,000) in 2005. If one
take into consideration that in 2005 the company recorded revenue of KM 79.16 million,
such a low profit cannot satisfy the management or the state, as a majority owner. Since
the owners were unable to improve corporate management practices, it was decided to
sell the company via direct negotiations and without setting a minimum price. Specific
tender conditions for this strategic company require the same conditions as in the
privatisation of Energoinvest: the potential buyer should retain the company’s core
activity and its 1,445 employees for at least three years after the purchase. Unlike
Energoinvest, where the offered price is the most important criteria, the agency defined
its evaluation criteria with priority to ensure the sustainable development of the
company, while price was worth only 25% of the evaluation of the bid.
The bidding deadline for Energoinvest is December 5, 2006 and for Hidrogradnja
December 13, 2006. The agency expects to announce the winning candidate by
January 9, 2007 and February 27, 2007, respectively. Even these minor move are
conditioned to some extent with political developments. Problems have arisen already
after FBH’s Minister for Energy, Mining and Industry (Vahid Heco) asked the
government to cancel the tenders, without giving detailed explanations63. The
agency’s Executive Board has positively evaluated the privatisation procedure for the
two companies, so only the government or parliament can cancel the privatisation
procedure. This has not happened yet, but ongoing disputes created a somewhat
unfavourable environment. In the week before the deadline (November 28, 2006) the
FBH’s Agency for Privatisation did not received any offers, and no interested party
even sent a request to obtain tender documents.
88
Rafał Antczak, Małgorzata Antczak, Karina Kostrzewa, Ranko Markuš, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 72/2007
62 Researcher’s interview with a Hidrogradnja representative confirmed that the company is working in various
markets, such as in Africa, the Middle East, Greece and Croatia. In some projects it is a member of a
consortium with U.S.’s Bechtel, Turkey's Enka and Greece's Aegek.
63 Researcher’s interview with representative of FBH Agency for Privatization.
Evaluation criteria for bids in the privatisation of strategic company Hidrogradnja:
Criteria Weight in bid evaluation
Offered price 25%
Planned investments 20%
Employment plans 25%
Proposed business plan 20%
Experience and the qualities of the candidate 10%
Obviously, realisation of the privatisation plan for the 23 large companies is not
being delayed by technical issues alone and as such no consolidated information on
the realisation of the plan has yet been published, although available fragments of
information indicate that the agency faces many problems, particularly with
companies based in territories ruled by Croat-majority political parties in Western
Herzegovina. Even during the preparation of the privatisation plan the agency did not
have at its disposal all the relevant information on the targeted companies64. As a form
of compromise in order to restart the privatisation process, in July 2006 the FBH
parliament legalised the transfer of ownership through financial support, which has
been the case in several collaborations to date between BH and Croatian companies
(e.g. the largest BH exporter – Aluminij Mostar65).
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64 For more data about ongoing processes see: www.apf.com.ba
65 The company was a subject of political and legal disputes in the last decade and the FBH Government finally
decided to establish a team that will select a consultant to prepare its privatization.
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No. Company
Total assets
(KM)
State-owned
stake Staff Offer date
1 Energoinvest-TDS engineering group 10,610,844 67% 259 January
2 UNIS Sarajevo metal products, construction 52,042,505 67% 93 February
3 TKA Cazin
cardboard and packaging
material 6,824,466 100% n/a February
4 KTK Visoko leather processing, rubber 103,924,279 67% 1,812 February
5 Sarajevo Osiguranje insurance 45,940,602 45.49% 500 March
6 Hidrogradnja Sarajevo civil engineering 70,756,714 67% 1,256 July
7 Hotel Stella Neum Tourism n/a n/a n/a March
8 Hotel Zenit-BRO Neum Tourism n/a n/a n/a March
9 Carton Print Stolac Cardboard n/a n/a n/a March
10 Energoinvest Sarajevo
civil engineering,
power transmission
220,742,540 67%. 834 May
11 Sipad Export Import forestry & wood processing 12,622,256 67%. 167 May
12 Agrokomerc Velika Kladusa food processing 310,248,737 90.33% 3,826 June
13 Aida Tuzla Footwear 11,525,537 98.81% n/a August
14 Fabrika Duhana Sarajevo tobacco and cigarettes 103,747,370 39.91% n/a September
15 Krivaja Zavidovici furniture 226,959,400 100% n/a June
16 Fabrika Duhana Mostar Tobacco and cigarettes 19,038,250 67% n/a June
17 Vitezit Vitez military industry n/a 100% n/a October
18 Veterinarske Stanice veterinary stations n/a n/a n/a September
19 Aluminij Mostar aluminium smelter n/a 48% n/a September
20 Zeljezara Zenica steel products 317,053,277 100% n/a November
21 Fabrika Sode Lukavac soda factory 36,721,234 95.52% n/a November
22 Hepok Mostar winery 18,796,074 67% n/a year-end
23 Soda-So Holding Tuzla (salt production) n/a n/a n/a year-end
Sector
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Annex 4: The FBH Sample
of Analysed Enterprises
Public sector Private sector
Industry Energoinvest Fabrika Cementa Lukavac
Fabrika Duhana Mostar Tvornica Cementa Kakanj
Zrak Sarajevo IGM Visoko
KTK Visoko KHK Lukavac
  Soko Mostar
  Soko RKT
  Inpek
  Astro
  Borac Travnik
  Solana Tuzla
Mining and quarrying Rudnik Boksita Bosanska Krupa RMU Banovic
  Rudnici Boksita Jajce
  Rudnik Zeljezne Rude Vares
Electricity,
gas and water supply Elektroprivreda Sarajevo  
Elektroprivreda Mostar  
Manufacturing Sarajevska Pivara
Pivara Tuzla
Bihacka Pivara
Klas
Sprind
Construction Hidrogradnja GP ZGP
Vranica
GP Put
GP Bosna
Asfaltgradnja
Trade and repair Tuzla Remont
DD Konjic
Merkur Mostar
Prehrana Promet Tuzla
DC Sarajevo
Services Hetmos Mostar Hoteli  Ilidza
HUT Aduna Bihac
Frizer
Iris computers
Transportation Autoprevoz Kreka Autoprevoz Mostar
  Prevoz Cazin
Telecommunication BH Telecom
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A
nnex 5: The Sam
ple of the B
anja Luka
Stock Exchange C
om
panies
Industry Symbol Industry Symbol Industry Symbol
ALUMINKA AD ŠIPOVO ALMN FABRIKA MOTORA SPECIJALNE
NAMJENE AD PALE
FMSN METALNO AD ZVORNIK MTNO
ALUMINA AD KNEŽEVO ALUM FABRIKA OTKOVAKA I ARMATU
RE AD BILEĆA
FOIA ENERGOINVEST RASK. OPREMA
AD I. SARAJEVO
RAOP
ENERGOINVEST AUTOMATIKA
AD SARAJEVO
ATMK FABRIKA SPECIJALNIH VOZILA
AD LUKAVICA
FSVS RAFINERIJA ULJA AD MODRICA RFUM
BIRAC AD ZVORNIK BIRA FABRIKA UPRAVLJACA SISTEMA 
OZUBLJENA LETVA AD NEVESINJE
FUSO RAFINERIJA NAFTE AD BOSANSKI
BROD
RNAF
BANJALUCKA PIVARA AD BANJA LUKA BLPV FABRIKA VIJAKA AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD FVMG SOKO HOLDING AD LJUBINJE SOKH
BIRAC ENERGO AD ZVORNIK BREN FABRIKA ŽICE AD USTIPRACA FZIC ŠIPAD AD DOBOJ SPDO
CAJAVEC ELEMENTI AUTOMATIKE
AD CELINAC
CELA SODA SO HEMOPRODUKT AD DOBOJ HMPR ŠIPAD-STOLAR AD BIJELJINA STLR
CISTOĆA AD BANJA LUKA CIST INDUSTRIJSKA PEKARA  AD TREBINJE IPEK ENERGOINVEST TDSK AD DOBOJ TDSK
CAJAVEC – ALATNICA AD BANJA LUKA CJAL INDUSTROPROJEKT AD PRIJEDOR IPRJ TVORNICA ZA OBRADU METALA
EKSPLOZIJOM AD PRIJEDOR
TOME
CAJAVEC SISTEMI UPRAVLJANJA
AD BANJA LUKA
CJSU JELŠINGRAD FAM AD BANJA LUKA JFAM UNIS FABRIKA CIJEVI AD DERVENTA UNFC
CAJAVEC ŠTAMPANE VEZE
AD BANJA LUKA
CJSV JELŠINGRAD FMD AD PRNJAVOR JFMD UNIS FABRIKA MAŠINA
AD USTIPRACA
UNFM
CAJAVEC AD BANJA LUKA CJVC JELŠINGRAD FMG AD GRADIŠKA JFMG UNIS USHA AD VIŠEGRAD USHA
CAJAVEC MEGA AD BANJA LUKA CMEG JELŠINGRAD AD BANJA LUKA JLLC TVORNICA AUTOMOBILA AD PALE UTAS
MIKROELEKTRONIKA AD BANJA
LUKA
CMEL FAMOS FABRIKA KORAN AD PALE KORN UNIS TSC AD PRNJAVOR UTSC
HEMIJSKA INDUSTRIJA DESTILACIJE
AD TESLIĆ
DEST LIVNICA AD LJUBIJA LIVN UŽARIJA AD ŠAMAC UZAR
DRVNA INDUSTRIJA AD KALINOVIK DIKL METAL BROD AD BOSANSKI BROD METB UZLOMAC AD KOTOR VAROŠ UZLM
DRVOPRERADA  AD ŠIPRAGE DRVP METAL EMAJL  AD BOSANSKI BROD METE VAZDUŠNA BANJA AD KNEŽEVO VAZB
FABRIKA AKUMULATORA
AS AD SREBRENICA
FAAS METAL  AD GRADIŠKA METL VUCJAK AD BOSANSKI BROD VCJK
FAMOS AD ISTOCNO SARAJEVO FAMO MIRA AD PRIJEDOR A VUCEVO AD FOC
FABRIKA DIJELOVA I SKLOPOVA
AD LJUBIJA
FDIS MLJEKARSKA INDUSTRIJA
AD BANJA LUKA
MLEK VITAMINKA AD BANJA LUKA VITA
VRBAS AD LAKTAŠI VRLA ZRAK OPTOMEHANIKA AD BILEĆA ZOPM DUBICANKA AD KOZARSKA DUBICA DUBI
VITINKA AD KOZLUK VTNK ŽITOPROMET DRINA  AD ZVORNIK ZPDR JAVOR AD PRIJEDOR JAVR
VETPRODUKT AD PRNJAVOR VTPR SHP CELEX AD BANJA LUKA CELX ZASTAVA AUTO AD BANJA LUKA ZSTA
MIR VCVO
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^ ^
^
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Services Symbol Services Symbol Services Symbol
KRAJINA AUTO ŠKOLA AD BANJA LUKA ASKR INTERŠPED AD DOBOJ INTE TOPLANA AD BANJA LUKA TPBL
BANJA LAKTAŠI AD LAKTAŠI BLAK
INSTITUT ZA ELEKTROENERGETIKU
AD SARAJEVO
IZEN TOPLANA AD PRIJEDOR TPPD
BOSNA TRGOVINA AD BANJA LUKA BSNT KRISTAL KONSALTING AD BANJA LUKA KKON TRANŠPED AD BANJA LUKA TRAN
ZTC BANJA VRUĆICA AD TESLIĆ BVRU KOMUNALAC AD BIJELJINA KMBJ UGOSTITELJSTVO AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD UGMG
CAJAVEC CENTAR ZA KVALITET
AD BANJA LUKA CCZK KOMUNALNO AD MILIĆI KMLN UGOTURS AD CELINAC UGOT
CISTOĆA AD BANJA LUKA CIST KOMUNALAC MODRICA AD MODRICA KMMD UGOSTITELJ AD ŠAMAC UGST
CISTOĆA KP AD ŠAMAC CSTC KOMUNALAC AD KOZARSKA DUBICA KMNC
UGOSTITELJSTVO I TURIZAM
AD PRIJEDOR
UGTP
CAJAVEC USLUŽNE DJELATNOSTI
AD BANJA LUKA
CUSD KOMUNALNO AD TREBINJE KMTB
URBANISTICKI ZAVOD
RS AD BANJA LUKA
URBZ
CVJEĆAR AD BANJA LUKA CVJR KONZUM TP AD BANJA LUKA KNZM USLUGA AD BANJA LUKA USLG
DOBOJINVEST AD DOBOJ DOIN PARK KP AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD KPMG TRANŠPED AD BANJA LUKA TRAN
DISTRIBUTIVNI CENTAR AD BIJELJINA DSTC KRAJINAPROMET AD BANJA LUKA KRJP UGOSTITELJSTVO AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD UGMG
EKONOMSKI INSTITUT AD BANJA LUKA EKIN KOZARATURIST UTP AD PRIJEDOR KZTR VETERINARSKA STANICA AD GACKO VSGC
GRADSKA CISTOĆA AD BRTUNAC GCBR
INTERNACIONAL MOTEL AD
BANJA LUKA MTIN VETERINARSKA STANICA AD ROGATICA VSRG
GLAS SRPSKI – GRAFIKA
AD BANJA LUKA GLSG OZRENTURIST AD DOBOJ OZTU VETERINARSKA STANICA AD FOCA VTSS
GLAS SRPSKE AD BANJA LUKA GLSS SRPSKE POŠTE AD BANJA LUKA POST VETERINARSKA STANICA AD RUDO VSRD
GLAS SRPSKI – TRGOVINA
AD BANJA LUKA
GLST PROJEKT AD BANJA LUKA PROJ
VETERINARSKA STANICA
AD BOSANSKI BROD
VTSB
ŠTAMPARIJA GRAFOKOMERC
AD TREBINJE GRFK PROMET TP AD PRNJAVOR PROM
VETERINARSKA STANICA
AD BRATUNAC VSBC
GRAFICAR AD DOBOJ G RFR PUTNIK AD BANJA LUKA PUTN
VETERINARSKA STANICA
AD BANJA LUKA VSBL
HOTEL BOSNA AD BANJALUKA HBSN REKREATURS AD BANJA LUKA REKT VETERINARSKA STANICA AD BIJELJINA VSBN
HOTEL KRAJINA AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD HTKR RELAKS AD BANJA LUKA RLKS VETERINARSKA STANICA A.D. CELINAC VSCL
HOTEL PRIJEDOR AD PRIJEDOR HTLP SAMACKI SMJEŠTAJ AD BANJA LUKA SAMS VETERINARSKA STANICA AD DOBOJ VSDB
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD KNEŽEVO VSKN
VETERINARSKA STANICA
AD SREBRENICA
VSSB VETERINARSKA STANICA AD ZVORNIK
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD PETROVO VSPT VETERINARSKA STANICA AD VLASENICA VSVL VETERINARSKA STANICA AD PRNJAVOR
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD LAKTAŠI VSLA VETERINARSKA STANICA AD ŠEKOVIĆI VSSE ŽITO AD VIŠEGRAD ZITO
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD LUKAVICA VSLK VETERINARSKA STANICA AD SOKOLAC VSSK ŽITOPROMET DRINA  AD ZVORNIK ZPDR
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD MODRICA VSMD VETERINARSKA STANICA AD ŠAMAC VSSM ŽITOPROMET AD BIJELJINA ZTPR
VETERINARSKA STANICA
AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD VSMG VETERINARSKA STANICA AD ŠIPOVO VSSP ŽITOPROMET AD PRIJEDOR ZTPT
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^ ^
^
^
^
^
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VETERINARSKA STANICA AD NOVI GRAD VSNG VETERINARSKA STANICA AD SRBAC VSSR ZAVOD ZA IZGRADNJU AD BANJA LUKA ZIBL
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD PALE VSPA VETERINARSKA STANICA AD TESLIĆ VSTS ŽITO AD VIŠEGRAD ZITO
VETERINARSKA STANICA AD PRIJEDOR VSPD VETERINARSKA STANICA AD UGLJEVIK VSUG ZAVOD ZA IZGRADNJU AD BANJA LUKA ZIBL
Manufacturing Symbol Manufacturing Symbol Manufacturing Symbol
BOSNA TRGOVINA AD BANJA LUKA BSNT MIRA AD PRIJEDOR MIRA TRIKO ITK AD GRADIŠKA TRIK
FABRIKA KOŽE LAUŠ AD BANJA LUKA FKLS PEKARA AD BOSANSKI BROD PKRA UNIS TSC AD PRNJAVOR UTSC
FABRIKA OBUĆE FOMG AD MRKONJIĆ 
GRAD FOMG PEKARSTVO AD VLASENICA PKVL UŽARIJA AD ŠAMAC UZAR
HRANAPRODUKT AD ŠAMAC HRPR PROIZVODNJA OBUĆE BM AD BRONZA
NI MAJDAN
POBM VEZIONICA AD ZVORNIK VEZN
KONFEKCIJA BORAC AD PRIJEDOR KBRC PREDIONICA AD TRNOVO PRED
VEZIONICA-SREBRENICA 
AD SREBRENICA
VEZS
KLAS AD DERVENTA KLAS PRERADA SA HLADNJACOM AD ZVORNIK PSHL KTK ALHOS AD SOKOLAC KTKA
KLJUC ŠIK  AD CAJNICE KSIK ROMANINKA-SPRIND AD SOKOLAC RMSP
TVORNICA DJECIJE TRIKOTAŽE
AD ŠIPOVO TDTR
Electricity, gas and water supply Symbol Trade and repair Symbol Construction Symbol
BIRAC ENERGO AD ZVORNIK BREN AUTOSERVIS KRAJINA AD BANJA LUKA ASRK CIGLANA AD GRADIŠKA CIGL
ELEKTRODISTRIBUCIJA AD PALE EDPL AUTOSERVIS CENTAR AD BANJA LUKA ATSC GRADNJA GP AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD GRAD
ELEKTROKRAJINA AD BANJA LUKA EKBL AUTOSERVIS AD ŠAMAC ATSR GRAÐA AD BANJA LUKA GRDA
ELEKTROHERCEGOVINA AD TREBINJE EKHC AUTOKOMERC AD DOBOJ AUTK GRAÐENJE AD UGLJEVIK GRDE
ELEKTRO-BIJELJINA AD BIJELJINA ELBJ KRAJINAPROMET AD BANJA LUKA KRJP GRADNJAMONT AD PETROVO GRDM
ELEKTRO DOBOJ AD DOBOJ ELDO KRAJINAPETROL AD BANJA LUKA KRPT GRADITELJ AD TESLIĆ GRDT
ELEKTROPRENOS AD BANJA LUKA ELPR
ZADRUŽNA TRGOVINA PPP
AD MRKONJIC GRAD ZTRG GRAÐEVINAR AD NOVI GRAD GRNR
ELEKTROPRIVREDA REPUBLIKE
SRPSKE AD TREBINJE ERST VELEPREHRANA AD BANJA LUKA VLPH GAS BETON CELKON AD BANJA LUKA GSBT
HIDROELEKTRANE NA DRINI
AD VIŠEGRAD HEDR VELEPROM AD PALE VLPM
GRAÐEVINSKO ZANATSTVO
AD TREBINJE GZAN
HIDROELEKTRANE NA VRBASU
AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD HELV VELEPROMET AD PRIJEDOR VLPR KRAJINA GP AD BANJA LUKA KRJN
HIDROELEKTRANE NA TREBIŠNJICI
AD TREBINJE
HETR VELEPROMET AD ZVORNIK VLPT MRAKOVICA GP AD PRIJEDOR MRKC
VODOVOD AD BANJA LUKA VDBL VELETRGOVINA AD GRADIŠKA VLTG NISKOGRADNJA AD TESLIĆ NGRD
VODOVOD I KANALIZACIJA
AD VLASENICA VDKN TRGOVINA LOPARE AD LOPARE TRGL PUT GP AD ISTOCNO SARAJEVO PTSA
VODOVOD AD KOZARSKA DUBICA VDKZ TRGOPROM AD KOTOR VAROŠ TRGP RAD GP AD BIJELJINA RADB
VODOVOD AD PRIJEDOR VDPR TRGOVINA AD LAKTAŠI TRGV VRBAS GP AD LAKTAZ VRBS
R I TE UGLJEVIK AD UGLJEVIK RTEU TRGOPRODAJA AD PRIJEDOR TRPD ALPRO AD VLASENICA ALPR
^ ^ ^
^
^
^
^
^
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Electricity, gas and water supply Symbol Trade and repair Symbol Construction Symbol
VODOVOD KP AD PRNJAVOR VDPV TRGOPROM AD BILEĆA TRPR INTAL AD MILIĆI
R I TE GACKO AD GACKO RITE PETROL AD BANJA LUKA PTRL ZLATIBOR GP AD BIJELJINA ZLTB
VODOPRIVREDA DRINA AD ZVORNIK VDRN TRŽNICA AD BANJA LUKA TRZN
Mining and quarrying Symbol Transportation Symbol Transportation Symbol
BOKSIT AD MILIĆI BOKS
AERODROMI REPUBLIKE SRPSKE
AD BANJA LUKA AERD JUGOPREVOZ AD BILEĆA JGPB
GIPSARA VOLARI AD ŠIPOVO GVLR AUTOPREVOZ AD BANJA LUKA APBL JUGOPREVOZ-GACKO AD GACKO JGPG
RUDNIK KAOLINA MOTAJICA AD SRBAC MTKS AUTOPREVOZ AD GRADIŠKA APGD JUGOPREVOZ TREBINJE AD TREBINJE JGPR
RUDNIK BOKSITA SREBRENICA
AD SREBRENICA
RBSC AUTOPREVOZ KOZARSKA DUBICA 
AD KOZARSKA DUBICA
APKD KOZARAPREVOZ AD NOVI GRAD KZPR
RUDNIK OLOVA I CINKA SASE
AD SREBRENICA
RSAS AUTOPREVOZ PPP AD SRBAC APSR KOZARAPUTEVI AD BANJA LUKA KZPT
RUDNIK KREÈNJAKA I TVORNICA
KRECA AD DOBOJ
RUDK AUTOTRANSPORT AD PRIJEDOR ATPD MRKONJIĆPUTEVI AD MRKONJIĆ GRAD MGPT
STANARI RUDNIK LIGNITA AD STANARI STNR AUTOTRANSPORT AD TESLIĆ ATRN NEVESINJEPUTEVI AD NEVESINJE NVPT
BIJELJINA PUT AD BIJELJINA BNPT OZREN-TRANSPORT AD PETROVO OTRN
CENTROTRANS AD ISTOCNO SARAJEVO CTRS PREVOZ AD SREBRENICA PREV
Telecom Symbol DOBOJPUTEVI AD DOBOJ DOPT PREVOZ AD NEVESINJE PRVZ
TELEKOM SRPSKE AD BANJA LUKA TLKM DRINA TRANS AD ZVORNIK DRTR
^
^
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